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In the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, physicists applied group representation theory to the 
quantum mechanics of atomic spectra.  At the same time, physicists developed an alternative 
approach to theoretical atomic spectra that avoids using group theory.  These two approaches 
exhibit nontrivial intellectual differences: the group theoretic approach provides a deeper 
understanding of many phenomena in atomic spectra.  By focusing on derivations of selection 
rules for atomic spectra, I explicate one case where group theory enhances understanding.  I refer 
to the non-group theoretic approach as the commutator approach; it serves as a benchmark for 
comparison.  This case study motivates a deflationary account of mathematical explanations in 
science.  According to my account, both group theoretic and commutator derivations explain 
selection rules for atomic spectra.  I use these derivations to problematize stronger accounts of 
mathematical explanation that rely on a notion of relevance.  Arguing that selection rules are an 
example of universality, I also criticize a strong interpretation of Batterman and Rice’s minimal 
model account of explanations of universality.  
After examining these accounts of explanation, I argue that explanatory criteria do not 
distinguish the intellectual content of the group theoretic and commutator approaches.  Instead, I 
develop an account of scientific understanding that distinguishes these approaches based on 
organizational differences.  Adopting terminology from Manders, I argue that these 
organizational differences arise from differences in the approach’s expressive means.  Group 
theory reorganizes selection rule derivations by re-expressing physical concepts more effectively 
than the commutator approach.  I argue that this superior organizational structure accounts for 
how group theory provides a heightened understanding of selection rules.  
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1.0  GROUP THEORY OR NO GROUP THEORY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The mathematical theory of groups and their representations has found widespread application in 
science. Among diverse fields, group theory has proven fruitful in crystallography, quantum 
mechanics, and particle physics (Cornwell 1984). It is often said that the applicability of group 
theory stems from its treatment of physical symmetry: group theory provides a natural language 
for reasoning about symmetries. A great deal more can be said. When group theory is fruitfully 
applied to a physical problem, there is a shared sense that an act of tremendous intellectual 
power has taken place. These applications represent a significant advance in our knowledge and 
understanding of physical phenomena. This thesis considers in detail one case where group 
theory affects an intellectual advance. Although examples can be multiplied, we gain much by 
looking closely at how intellectual progress is wrought. In this case, there is an alternative 
mathematical approach that avoids using group theory. This alternative approach facilitates an 
articulation of what group theory contributes intellectually.  
One of the earliest applications of group theory was to a theoretical account of atomic 
spectroscopy. Physicists developed this theory in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a testing 
ground for the nascent quantum mechanics. Eugene Wigner (1927) and Hermann Weyl (1927) 
published the first papers detailing the application of group theory to quantum mechanics. Weyl 
published a monograph in 1928, which was revised and expanded by 1931. Wigner and John von 
Neumann collaborated on a series of papers that further developed a group theoretic approach 
(1928a, b, c). Wigner compiled this work into an introductory text in 1931. Bartel van der 
Waerden (1932) also published a monograph. These works—which are still read fruitfully 
today—demonstrate how quickly applied group theory reached maturity in theoretical atomic 
spectroscopy. Its application spurred numerous other developments in molecular and nuclear 
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physics in the 1930s and 40s. As such, it is surprising that physicists in general were slow to 
adopt group theoretic methods in atomic spectroscopy. In the theory of atomic spectra, physicists 
viewed group theory as largely unnecessary for more than 20 years after its initial application.  
This widespread dismissal of group theory was motivated largely by the success of an 
alternative approach to atomic spectra that made no explicit use of groups. In their monumental 
1935 text (reprinted in 1964), The Theory of Atomic Spectra, E. U. Condon and G. H. Shortley 
gave a successful account of atomic spectra that remained the standard textbook on the subject 
for a few decades. B. R. Judd, a popularizer of the group theoretic approach, has called Condon 
and Shortley’s text “a volume seemingly insusceptible of improvement” (Judd 1963, v). In 
particular, their third chapter relies heavily on algebraic relationships between quantum 
mechanical operators. These commutation relations stem from the quantum theory of angular 
momentum, introduced by Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan (1926) and further developed by Born 
and Jordan (1930) and Güttinger and Pauli (1931).  
These two approaches—the group theoretic and non-group theoretic—afford two ways of 
understanding numerous problems in atomic spectra. Unlike many cases of alternative physical 
theories, these approaches do not compete with each other. It is not the case that only one of 
them provides a correct theory of atomic spectra. Although the early years of quantum 
mechanics witnessed methodological tension between the two approaches, they were never held 
as incompatible theories. In their text, Condon and Shortley acknowledge the work done by 
Wigner, Weyl, and van der Waerden, directing the interested reader to their monographs. 
Mathematically, these two approaches are related aspects of Lie theory. The group theoretic 
approach uses mathematical structures known as Lie groups—topological groups that support the 
methods of calculus. The non-group theoretic approach avoids discussion of groups by implicitly 
utilizing Lie algebras. These mathematical structures are vector spaces equipped with a 
commutator product. Each Lie group gives rise to a Lie algebra. In special cases, much of the 
information about a Lie group is recoverable from its Lie algebra (Cornwell 1984). 
Despite this mathematical connection between the two approaches, their treatments of 
atomic spectra are distinctive. In the end, they recover many of the same phenomena, but the 
paths they take are markedly different. They employ alternative mathematical concepts and 
solution procedures, giving rise to distinct characters of thought. To make these differences 
amenable to philosophical analysis, I focus on a specific class of phenomena: selection rules in 
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atomic spectra. Selection rules provide restrictions governing how atoms transition from one 
atomic state to another. During these transitions, an electron undergoes a change in energy level, 
and radiation is either absorbed by or emitted from an atom. Although only a small piece of the 
grand edifice that is our theory of atomic spectra, selection rules are of immense empirical and 
theoretical importance.
1
 Empirically, selection rules are necessary for the proper interpretation of 
the information encoded in spectra (Engel and Hehre 2010, p. 218). Spectroscopy itself performs 
a crucial epistemic function as the source of “most of the direct experimental information we 
have about the structure of atoms and molecules” (Flurry 1980, p. 160).  
Methodologically, selection rules provide an attractive case study because physicists have 
thoroughly treated them from both the group theoretic and non-group theoretic vantage points. 
On the non-group theoretic side, early presentations are found in Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan 
(1926), Dirac (1930) and subsequent editions, and Condon and Shortley (1935). This viewpoint 
has also survived in more modern treatments (Griffiths 2005). Since these non-group theoretic 
treatments proceed primarily through commutation relations, I refer to them as the commutator 
approach to selection rules. On the group theoretic side, Wigner (1927, 1931) and van der 
Waerden (1932) include treatments. Most modern expositions of applied group theory in 
quantum mechanics derive selection rules as an illustrative example of group theoretic methods 
(Tinkham 1964; Petrashen and Trifonov 1969). 
 In Chapter 2, I present derivations of selection rules from both the commutator and 
group theoretic viewpoints. These derivations aim to answer the following why-question: why do 
atoms of low atomic number exhibit the same selection rules upon excitation? This question is an 
instance of what Batterman (2002) calls a type (ii) explanatory why-question: “A type (ii) why-
question asks why, in general, patterns of a given type can be expected to obtain” (p. 23). Here, 
we are interested in why atoms of different atomic number exhibit the same pattern of selection 
rules. In their own ways, both the commutator and group theoretic approaches provide answers 
to this question. 
 
                                                 
1
 For an illuminating historical study of the development of selection rules and Wigner’s early application 
of group theory, see Borrelli (2009).  
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1.2 DISTINGUISHING EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 
The lack of a unique method for deriving selection rules facilitates an analysis of mathematical 
explanations in science and scientific understanding. Since the commutator and group theoretic 
derivations do not compete with each other, we can accept them both as legitimate methods for 
deriving selection rules. I refer to this lack of competition as compatibility: the two approaches to 
deriving selection rules are compatible. If the two approaches were incompatible, we could 
distinguish them based on which one—if either—we should ultimately accept. Thanks to 
compatibility, we do not need to exclusively choose one approach over the other when it comes 
to explaining and understanding selection rules. Compatibility raises more subtle questions about 
how the approaches differ regarding explanation and understanding. In particular, I examine 
whether or not either approach should be viewed as explanatory; ultimately, I argue that both 
approaches provide explanations of selection rules. Although both approaches explain selection 
rules, they exhibit a decisive intellectual asymmetry. Introducing group theoretical concepts 
enables a more illuminating treatment of selection rule phenomena, providing enhanced 
understanding. In articulating the source of this enhanced insight, the commutator approach 
serves as a useful benchmark for comparison. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I distinguish explanation from understanding. My terminological 
distinction is motivated by the task of articulating how group theory provides enhanced 
understanding. Prior to analysis, it is conceivable that the group theoretic approach is genuinely 
explanatory of selection rules while the commutator approach is explanatorily deficient. If true, 
this account would provide a simple story about how group theory enhances understanding: the 
group theoretic account alone would provide explanations of selection rules. I resist this way of 
interpreting the derivations. In Chapter 3, I argue that both approaches should be seen as 
explanatory. In doing so, I aim to separate our philosophical term “genuine explanation” into two 
components: “explanation” and “understanding.” I defend a minimal account of explanation 
according to which an argument is explanatory if it recovers a phenomenon of interest according 
to principled constraints. Thus, when I refer to an argument as explanatory, I do not have in mind 
a richer sense of genuine explanation. I believe that much of the richness present in “genuine 
explanation” is better dealt with under the term “scientific understanding.” My account of 
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understanding characterizes insight in terms of organizational virtues such as modularization, 
tractability, and uniformity of treatment.  
Although my use of the words “explanation” and “understanding” are nonstandard, I 
believe that this way of speaking facilitates an analysis of how mathematics provides insight in 
science. When philosophers debate which of two compatible approaches is genuinely 
explanatory of a phenomenon, it is more fruitful to take both approaches as explanatory and 
analyze their intellectual differences. These differences pertain to differences in re-expressing 
physical problems, restructuring solution procedures, and reorganizing relationships between 
physical and mathematical constraints. Although they account for much of the richness of our 
usual notion of explanation, they have little to do with “explanation” in the weaker sense that I 
employ. Hence, I find it convenient to separate these two notions, even though they are usually 
intertwined in discussions of genuine explanation.   
In Chapter 3, I motivate my minimal restriction on explanation through an analysis of 
more restrictive accounts of explanation. I consider a family of positions that I refer to as 
relevance accounts of explanation. Relevance accounts contend that an argument is explanatory 
only when it references relevant physical and mathematical features while eliminating irrelevant 
details. If relevance accounts are correct, then we should determine which of the commutator or 
group theoretic approaches better satisfies these restrictions on explanation. For the sake of 
argument, assume that upon investigation we would find that the group theoretic approach 
eliminates more irrelevant details and references a greater number of relevant features. 
Relevance accounts would legitimize the group theoretic approach as providing a more genuine 
explanation. Furthermore, relevance accounts would locate the superior understanding provided 
by the group theoretic approach in the elimination of irrelevant details and greater reliance on 
relevant features.  
In Section 3.3.1, I resist this characterization by problematizing relevance accounts. 
Relevance accounts contend that determinations of relevance ground explanations. I argue that—
at least in the context of my case study—it is my minimal sense of explanation that grounds 
determinations of relevance. This introduces a circularity problem for relevance accounts: 
relevance should not be taken to ground explanation if explanatory success grounds relevance. 
Section 3.3.2 develops a related problem arising from the existence of multiple compatible 
explanations of a given phenomenon. Since compatible explanations rely on different sets of 
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physical and mathematical features, relevance accounts seem committed to determining a unique 
set of relevant features. More charitably, relevance accounts must determine which of two sets of 
mathematical and physical features references a greater number of relevant details and eliminates 
a greater number of irrelevant details. To make these determinations of relevance, we would rely 
on my minimal notion of explanation. This strengthens the circularity problem introduced in 
Section 3.3.1.  
In the specific context of explanations of universality, Batterman and Rice (unpublished) 
develop an alternative account of explanation. In physics, universality refers to a pattern of 
behavior exhibited by a class of physical systems whose members are constitutionally distinct. 
For instance, both water and gasoline—although micro-structurally distinct—exhibit a parabolic 
momentum profile under laminar flow conditions. A parabolic momentum profile is a universal 
behavior exhibited by a universality class of fluids, including water and gasoline. Explanatory 
questions about universality are a particular kind of type (ii) why-question: they ask why a given 
universal behavior obtains in this class of systems. Section 3.4 presents the details of Batterman 
and Rice's account, which focuses specifically on explanations of universality. I argue that 
selection rules are properly seen as a kind of universal behavior, making Batterman and Rice's 
account germane to my analysis of explanation in the context of selection rules. Batterman and 
Rice criticize relevance accounts—which they refer to as “common features accounts”—for a 
similar reason to the circularity challenge that I develop.  
However, Batterman and Rice place more restrictions on explanations of universality 
than the deflationary account of explanation that I defend. In Section 3.5, I consider two 
interpretations of Batterman and Rice's prescriptive claims regarding genuine explanations of 
universality. On a literal interpretation of Batterman and Rice's restrictions, explanations of 
universality must undertake a stability analysis that identifies a “minimal model” and delimits its 
universality class. This literal interpretation is in tension with scientific practice. Most, if not all, 
published derivations of selection rules do not conduct the kind of stability analysis prescribed 
by Batterman and Rice. To defuse this tension, I propose a weaker interpretation of Batterman 
and Rice's account of explanation. I argue that we should interpret Batterman and Rice as 
offering a methodological prescription for good explanatory practice, rather than a strict 
requirement for genuine explanation. This prevents my minimal account of explanation from 
conflicting with Batterman and Rice's stricter account in the context of selection rules. Even 
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though derivations of selection rules do not satisfy Batterman and Rice’s requirements, we can 
view them as explanatory nonetheless. At the same time, scientists could potentially provide 
further justification for the usual explanations of selection rules by meeting the criteria laid out 
by Batterman and Rice. 
Having defended both the commutator and group theoretic approaches as explanatory, I 
turn in Chapter 4 to the question of how they differ in the understanding they provide. I begin in 
Section 4.1 by disentangling two senses in which an explanation can be better than an alternative 
explanation. Assuming that both explanations are empirically adequate, we might compare their 
relative theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, elegance, and fruitfulness. Appeal to theoretical 
virtues is a standard move when using inference to the best explanation (IBE) to allay 
underdetermination problems. Some scientific realists take these theoretical virtues to be truth-
tracking, thereby providing an epistemic means for preferring an explanation or theory among 
competing alternatives. This strategy relies on a first sense of “better explanation,” according to 
which an explanation is better if it is closer to the truth. This first sense of “better explanation” is 
not relevant for characterizing the intellectual features that arise in my case study. Unlike 
competing alternatives, derivations of selection rules from the commutator and group theoretic 
approaches are compatible. Hence, we do not need to determine which approach is closer to the 
truth. Instead, we should focus on a second sense of “better explanation” that emphasizes how 
compatible explanations can differ in the insight they provide. In this context, theoretical virtues 
remain important, but their importance is divorced of any purported relationship to truth. When I 
return to these virtues in Section 4.3, I argue that they are organizational in nature: they deal with 
how an approach structures the solution to a problem. 
The commutator and group theoretic approaches differ in their organizational virtues 
because they rely on different conceptual resources to explain selection rules. Section 4.2 
undertakes a characterization of these conceptual differences and their consequences for the 
phenomena that both approaches can address. Adopting terminology introduced by Manders 
(unpublished), I use the phrase “expressive means” to denote the mathematical and physical 
concepts employed by an approach. Because alternative concepts sometimes make accessible the 
same phenomenon, I distinguish expressive means from expressive power. I use “expressive 
power” to denote the set of phenomena that a conceptual framework can talk about. Differences 
in expressive power arise from differences in expressive means. The group theoretic approach is 
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able to characterize symmetries of atomic systems that remain inaccessible to the commutator 
approach. This difference in expressive power enables the group theoretic approach to 
restructure the problem of deriving selection rules. In Section 4.3, I argue that group theory 
deepens our understanding of selection rules by providing a more effective organizational 
structure for reasoning about them.  
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2.0  TWO APPROACHES TO SELECTION RULES 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the group theoretic and commutator approaches as compatible 
frameworks for deriving selection rules. In Chapters 3 and 4, I use these compatible approaches 
to advance an account of scientific explanation and understanding. These analyses are supported 
by the nitty-gritty details of the commutator and group theoretic derivations. Hence, before 
proceeding, I collect relevant background information for understanding these derivations. 
Section 2.1 introduces selection rules in atomic spectra for hydrogenic and multi-electron atoms. 
Readers who are comfortable with the basic theory of atomic spectra can safely skim or skip 
most of this section, with the exception of 2.1.5, where I characterize selection rules as an 
example of universality. Section 2.2 details the commutator approach to selection rules in atomic 
spectroscopy. It is not necessary to follow every step in the derivations. They are provided for 
completeness, and through them I aim to convey a sense of what goes on in this approach. 
Section 2.3 presents an alternative group theoretical approach to selection rules. It would be 
natural to proceed further and consider group theoretic and commutator approaches to the 
Wigner-Eckart theorem. This theorem extends further our understanding of selection rules. 
Nonetheless, the remarks made in Chapters 3 and 4 do not require these additional details, so I 
leave them aside for future work.  
2.1 SELECTION RULES IN ATOMIC SPECTROSCOPY 
In the most general sense, spectroscopy consists in the recorded interaction of electromagnetic 
radiation with matter. Upon excitation—e.g. by means of heating—chemical substances such as 




 enabling the composition of stars, nebulae, and other light-
emitting bodies to be identified.  
The emitted wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation are commonly expressed via wave 
numbers, υ, which are the reciprocals of the corresponding wavelengths:      , commonly 
expressed in units of cm
-1
. In a typical atomic spectrum, such as that of a hydrogen atom, the 
lines occur in collections called “series.” The lines within a given series exhibit a regular 
decrease in their spacing and eventually converge to a limit. The first series of lines discovered 
for hydrogen lies in the visible range (consisting of wavelengths from around 385 to 780 nm) and 
is known as the Balmer series. Balmer discovered that the wave numbers can be characterized by 
the formula 







where R is the Rydberg constant—with value of 109,737.3 cm-1—and n1 is a natural number 
taking values 3, 4, 5, etc.   
The Balmer series is the result of atomic transitions from excited states of hydrogen to 
the second lowest energy state, characterized by n2 = 2. Similarly, the Pfund series occurs when 
the electron orbiting hydrogen falls to the fifth lowest energy level: n = 5. The wavenumbers of 






 ) where n1 now ranges over 
6, 7, 8, etc.  
Generalizing these formulae, spectroscopists began to write wave numbers as the 
difference between two spectroscopic terms:         , where the terms generally have more 
complicated formulas than those for hydrogen. The empirical Rydberg-Ritz combination 
principle states that the difference between two spectroscopic terms yields a wave number 
corresponding to a spectral line. If this principle held exactly, then many more spectral lines 
would be observed than are in practice. In fact, only wave numbers corresponding to certain 
combinations of terms occur with appreciable intensity. This means that transitions occur only 
between certain states of the atom: given an initial state, there are restrictions on the final state 
after emission of radiation. These restrictions are characterized by the selection rules for spectral 
                                                 
2
 Depending on the method of excitation, the emission spectra of a single substance will exhibit variations 
in the intensity of the lines, although these variations do not normally lead to ambiguity in identifying the substance. 
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transitions. While most of the selection rules admit numerous exceptions and have restricted 
domains of validity, they have proved extremely useful in the interpretation and characterization 
of spectra. 
2.1.1 Stationary States for Hydrogenic Atoms 
Selection rules are formulated using indices known as quantum numbers, which characterize 
stationary states of an atom. Mathematically, quantum numbers are the eigenvalues of operators 
which commute with the system’s Hamiltonian—an operator that describes the energy of the 
system. In virtue of commuting with the Hamiltonian, these operators represent observable 
quantities that are constants of motion, i.e. quantities which are conserved over time. Often, the 
eigenvalues of a given observable are degenerate. This means that multiple stationary states 
possess the same value for this observable. However, these stationary states differ in general in at 
least one eigenvalue, i.e. they are described by a different set of quantum numbers. By finding a 
complete set of commuting observables, it is possible to label all of the possible energy states of 
a system.  
For hydrogen and other hydrogenic (one-electron) atoms, the electron moves in a 
coulomb potential. Coulomb potentials are spherically symmetric, and neglecting relativistic and 
spin effects, the energy of the electron depends only on the radial distance from the atomic 
nucleus. The Hamiltonian operator corresponds to the energy of the atomic state, and the 
eigenvalue of the Hamiltonian is denoted by n, referred to as the principal quantum number. The 
principal quantum number takes integer values 1, 2, 3, etc., a manifestation of the fact that the 
energy of the atom is quantized so long as the electron remains bound.  
When relativistic and spin effects are neglected, the orbital angular momentum operator, 
L
2
, commutes with the Hamiltonian. This reflects the rotational symmetry of the electron in the 
coulomb potential, which gives rise to the conservation of angular momentum. Formally, the 
eigenvalues of the orbital angular momentum operator are given by  [      ]   , where   
equals Planck’s constant divided by 2π, and l is an integer which takes values from 0, 1, 2, . . . , 
n-1. These eigenvalues represent the magnitude of the orbital angular momentum of the electron. 
Since [      ]     , the orbital angular momentum is often approximated by   , and l is used 
as the quantum number,  commonly referred to as the azimuthal quantum number.
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The angular momentum is a vector quantity with components in three directions. 
However, as a consequence of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, only one of these three 
directional components can be measured with arbitrary accuracy. As a matter of convention, the 
z-component is generally specified. The operator for the z-component of the angular momentum 
is denoted by Lz, and it also commutes with the Hamiltonian. Thus, the eigenvalues of Lz are also 
quantum numbers of the system. These eigenvalues are denoted by ml, known as the magnetic 
quantum number. Whereas the total orbital angular momentum has magnitude  [      ]   , its 
projection along the z-axis has magnitude ml  .  
When relativistic and spin effects are taken into account, atomic states characterized by 
the same n quantum number but different l quantum numbers are no longer degenerate. 
However, the collection of states with the same n and l quantum numbers remain degenerate. 
These states are further distinguished by the quantum number ml which takes integer values from 
–l to l, for a total of 2l+1 degenerate states, each with quantum number n and orbital angular 
momentum quantum number l. These 2l+1 states arise because an atom is degenerate with 
respect to its orientation in space (so-called space degeneracy). This degeneracy is eliminated in 
a magnetic field; the observed splitting of the spectral lines is known as the Zeeman effect.  
In addition to orbital angular momentum, electrons have an intrinsic spin angular 
momentum, s, with magnitude ½  . A vector quantity, the intrinsic spin also has a direction. For 
electrons, the spin can either be “up” or “down.” The direction of s gives rise to a fourth quantum 
number ms, which takes values +1/2 and -1/2, corresponding to up and down respectively.  
Together, the four quantum numbers n, l, ml, and ms uniquely identify the stationary states of a 
hydrogenic atom.  
2.1.2 Selection Rules for Hydrogenic Atoms 
To see how quantum numbers are used in the labeling of spectral transitions, we will briefly 
examine the spectrum of the hydrogen atom. As explained above, the observed spectrum takes 
the form of a series of lines, each line corresponding to a particular wavelength of emitted 
radiation. The energy of the radiation is itself proportional to the frequency,   , according to the 
formula               . Due to the conservation of energy, the energy of the emitted photon 
equals the change in energy of the atomic state: 
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Thus,       . From this relationship between the frequency of the radiation and the 
spectral transitions, we can infer the energy levels of the hydrogen atom. Indeed, the observation 
of discrete spectral lines was some of the earliest evidence that the electronic states of atoms are 
quantized, with electrons only capable of occupying discrete states of energy, rather than a 
continuous range of energy values.
3
  
These spectral transitions are organized using a Grotian diagram (also known as a term 
diagram or energy-level diagram), shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Grotian Diagram for Atomic Spectrum of Hydrogen 
 
In Figure 1, the energy of the atomic states increases from the bottom to the top. The 
values of n run upwards in the diagram, forming rows. The values of l run across the diagram, 
forming columns. The lowest energy level is known as the ground state, which in the case of 
hydrogen has energy of -13.6 electron volts. As explained above, the energy of a given atomic 
state depends only on the quantum numbers n and l and is degenerate for the quantum numbers 
                                                 
3
 Upon ionization, the electron is no longer bound, and the atom exhibits a continuous spectrum. Selection 
rules only apply—and indeed only have sense—in the discrete portion of the atomic spectrum.  
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ml and ms. Thus, it is unnecessary to use ml and ms in labeling the diagram. The relative spacing 
of the energy levels shows that states with the same value of n, but different l values, have 
approximately the same energy, confirming the meaningfulness of the early neglect of relativistic 
and spin effects, which break this degeneracy. 
Prima facie, it might be thought that given the various electronic energy levels, 
transitions could occur from any level to any other level. Yet after constructing an energy level 
diagram, we notice that spectral transitions occur between energy levels only if certain 
conditions are satisfied. These restrictions are known as selection rules, and they specify the 
possible states to which an electron in a given state can transition. For hydrogenic atoms 
transitioning under electric dipole radiation—the most intense radiative mechanism—the 
following selection rules are observed: 
 
1. ∆n is unrestricted. The principal quantum number can change by any integer 
value.  
2. ∆l = ±1. The orbital angular momentum quantum number can change only by 1. 
3. ∆ml = 0, ±1. The magnetic quantum number can change by zero or one.  
 
Returning to our simple example of the hydrogen spectra, we can see how these rules 
apply. For an electronic state with a given value of n, a spectral transition can occur to a state 
with any other value of n, provided that the other selection rules are satisfied. For a state with 
quantum number l = 1, spectral transitions can occur only to states with l = 0 or l = 2, provided 
again that the other rules are satisfied. Due to space degeneracy, the selection rule for the 
magnetic quantum number is not apparent on a Grotian diagram. This selection rule becomes 
apparent only when a hydrogen atom is placed within a magnetic field, which breaks a spatial 
symmetry and makes the states with different ml distinguishable.  
2.1.3 Stationary States and Selection Rules for Many-Electron Atoms4 
For many electron atoms, the wavefunctions of the atom are treated to first approximation as a 
product of one-electron wavefunctions. In this so-called “orbital approximation,” each electron 
moves in an approximate spherical potential created by the average interactions of all the other 
                                                 
4
 For further details, confer Herzberg (1944).  
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electrons. Since this potential is spherical, each electron can again be labeled with four quantum 
numbers n, l, ml, and ms. By labeling the electrons in this manner, we form electron 
configurations for the ground states of each atom. For instance, oxygen has an electron 






, indicating that there are two electrons labeled with 
n=1 and l=0, two electrons with n=2 and l=0, and four electrons with n=2 and l=1.  
In the many-electron case, the individual li’s form a resultant L, which represents the total 
orbital angular momentum of the atom. Likewise, the individual s’s for each electron are added 
to form a resultant S, representing the total spin angular momentum of the electrons orbiting the 
atom. These resultants L and S couple to form the total angular momentum, J, of an atom.  
All three of these overall angular momentum quantum numbers L, S, and J are vector 
quantities and can take 2x+1 different directions along a preferred axis, which is arbitrarily 
chosen to be the z-axis. For instance, the z-component of the total angular momentum quantum 
number, MJ, is quantized in any one of 2J+1 possible directions, with magnitudes ranging over 
the values –J, –J + 1, . . ., J–1, J. Likewise, ML ranges over –L, –L + 1, . . ., L–1, L and MS over  
–S, –S + 1, . . ., S–1, S. Depending on the relative orientation of the total orbital angular 
momentum and the total spin angular momentum, a given electron configuration can exhibit a 
number of different energy states. These different energy states correspond to the spectroscopic 
terms organized empirically on an energy-level diagram. For instance, the term 
3
P2 denotes an 
energy level characterized by a total orbital angular momentum of L=1 (denoted by P), and a 
spin multiplicity (denoted by the left superscript) of 3=2S+1, which implies a total spin angular 
momentum of 1. The orbital and spin angular momentum sum to a total angular momentum of J= 
2, denoted by the right subscript.  
For many-electron atoms, the selection rules are characterized in terms of the overall 
angular momentum quantum numbers L, S, and J. For spectral transitions arising from electric 
dipole radiation and occurring in atoms with atomic numbers less than 40, ∆S = 0, ∆L = 0, ±1, ∆J 
= 0, ±1, and ∆MJ = 0, ±1. The most intense transitions generally arise from the transition of a 
single electron. Thus, in addition to the selection rules for the resultant angular momenta, the 
selection rules seen in the hydrogenic case also hold. Namely, for the transitioning electron, 
∆l=±1 and ∆ml = 0, ±1.  
Transitions that violate these selection rules are called “forbidden” transitions, while 
transitions which satisfy all rules are “allowed” transitions. In reality, these selection rules are 
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only approximate restrictions that account for the most salient features of a system. Forbidden 
transitions that violate these rules are often weakly allowed, appearing as rather faint lines in the 
spectrum. A number of factors lead to violations of the selection rules, including higher order 
radiative transition mechanisms such as electric quadruple radiation and magnetic dipole 
radiation, the presence of electric or magnetic fields, coupling of the resultant angular 
momentum with the nuclear spin, and double-electron transitions. The selection rules listed 
above describe the restrictions on electric dipole radiation. This radiative mechanism is in 




 times more intense than those produced 
by higher order radiative mechanisms. For this reason, selection rules for electric dipole radiation 
are the ones most easily accounted for on energy-level diagrams.  
For many electron atoms, the individual orbital and spin angular momenta (the li’s and 
s’s) of the electrons provide only approximate descriptions of the atomic state. As the result of 
coupling of the orbital and spin angular momenta (known as spin-orbit coupling), the individual 
angular momenta lose their meaning as well-defined descriptions of separate momenta. This has 
the further consequence of making the resultant orbital and spin angular momenta, L and S, also 
approximate. For relatively light atoms, spin orbit coupling is small, and L and S provide useful 
descriptions of atomic states. In this approximation scheme, the individual li’s are coupled to 
form L, and the individual ms’s coupled to form S. L and S are then coupled to form J. This is 
known as Russell-Saunder’s (or LS) coupling, and it was used in formulating the selection rules 
above.  
As the atomic number of the atom increases, the effects of spin-orbit coupling become 
more pronounced, and L and S lose their meaning. More frequent and intense transitions are seen 
which violate the ∆S = 0 and ∆L = 0, ±1 rules. For heavy atoms, a different coupling procedure 
known as j-j coupling is used. For mid-weight atoms, intermediate coupling schemes are most 
appropriate. Nevertheless, the total angular momentum J (and its z-component MJ) remains well-
defined for all atoms. In the following, I focus on the selection rules for electric dipole radiation 
in atoms of low atomic number.   
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2.1.4 Matrix Elements of the Perturbation Operator 
Early explanations of selection rules were given in terms of the correspondence principle, a 
frequent explanatory tool of the old quantum theory. With the advent of quantum mechanics, 
selection rules were soon derived as consequences of basic principles. A number of conceptually 
distinct derivations were developed, including wave-mechanical derivations employing the 
eigenfunctions of atomic Hamiltonians, matrix mechanical derivations using angular momentum 
operators, and group theoretical derivations utilizing irreducible representations of groups of 
commuting observables. A common goal unites these different approaches: the conditions must 
be found under which the matrix elements of the perturbation equal zero. 
Spectral transitions are fundamentally time-dependent phenomena, and all derivations of 
selection rules begin with an application of time-dependent perturbation theory. Sparing the 
mathematical details, the result is that the probability of transition from an initial state    to a 
final state    is proportional to the squared modulus of a matrix element ⟨  | |  ⟩, where   is 
the perturbation operator. The matrix element ⟨  | |  ⟩ is equivalent to the integral over three 
dimensional space of the product of the complex conjugate of    with the product of    and   . 
Thus, we can write the following equality: ⟨  | |  ⟩  ∫  
      . Both of these expressions 
are known as the transition moment integral (TMI), which always equals a real number.  
Physically, the transition moment integral represents the interaction between the system 
and an external perturbation, such as impinging electromagnetic radiation. Under certain 
conditions (given by selection rules), this interaction causes the system to transition from an 
initial state (represented by   ) to a final state. In emission spectroscopy, a transition results in 
the emission of radiation from the system.  
The transition moment integral (TMI) is proportional to the intensity of emitted radiation. 
Thus, when the TMI equals zero, no transition occurs from the given initial to final states under 
the perturbation  . Given this proportionality, the problem of deriving selection rules is 
equivalent to the problem of finding the conditions under which the transition moment integral 
equals zero.  Since the most intense transitions arise from electric dipole radiation, I focus on the 
case where   is the operator for electric dipole radiation. This operator is given by       , 
where “ec” stands for the elementary charge of an electron, and “r” is the three-dimensional 
position vector; it has Cartesian components  ̂  ̂      ̂. Insofar as we are interested in 
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accounting for the most salient spectral transitions, we are mainly interested in those arising from 
an electric dipole mechanism. 
 
2.1.5 Selection Rules as an Example of Universality 
In the remainder of this chapter, I present derivations of selection rules from both the 
commutator and group theoretic viewpoints. As we examine these derivations, it is important to 
keep in mind what we are trying to explain. We are not particularly interested in explaining why 
a particular atomic system exhibits the selection rules that it does in a given experimental setup. 
Rather, we are primarily interested in explaining why a large class of atomic systems exhibits the 
same selection rules. Batterman (2002) has developed an account of explanation tailored to these 
sorts of shared patterns of behavior, which are called universal behaviors. In this section, I argue 
that selection rules fall under the scope of Batterman’s account. I return to this point in Chapter 3 
where I consider Batterman and Rice’s (unpublished) account of minimal model explanations, 
which explain universal behaviors. Batterman and Rice’s account bears directly on the case study 
that I examine here.  
Selection rules are an example of a particular kind of physical phenomenon, known as a 
universality behavior. Physicists describe behavior as universal when many, structurally distinct, 
physical systems exhibit analogous behavior under analogous circumstances. As a paradigmatic 
example, we can consider phase transitions exhibited by fluids and magnets at their critical 
points. Even though these systems have vastly different micro-physical constitutions, many of 
them undergo phase transitions according to the same critical exponent (Batterman 2002, chapter 
4). Similarly, atomic systems with low atomic numbers (less than 40 protons in the nucleus) 
exhibit the same set of selection rules. These atomic systems are micro-structurally distinct, 
possessing different numbers of protons, neutrons, and electrons along with different electron 
configurations. Nevertheless, upon excitation by electromagnetic radiation, they emit spectral 
lines governed by the same pattern of selection rules. These spectral lines are themselves a 
macroscopic phenomenon. Some spectral lines—such as those of hydrogen’s Balmer series—
even occur in the visible spectrum. Although we only notice selection rules when we reorganize 
the frequencies of these spectral lines into an energy level diagram, it is fair to say that selection 
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rules govern a macroscopic phenomenon. They determine which spectral lines are allowable by 
constraining transitions between atomic energy levels.   
To explain a case of universality, we embark upon a particular kind of explanatory task. 
In his account of scientific explanation, Batterman (2002) characterizes explanations of 
universality as a species of type (ii) why-questions. A type (ii) why-question “asks why, in 
general, patterns of a given type can be expected to obtain” (Batterman 2002, p. 23). 
Explanations of universality are of this form. We are interested in explaining why a class of 
disparate systems displays a shared behavior. Batterman distinguishes type (ii) why-questions 
from a distinct explanatory task, termed type (i) why-questions. Type (i) why-questions probe 
why a given physical system exhibited the behavior it did under a given circumstance (2002, p. 
23). For instance, if I am working on a physical chemistry lab experiment, I might be interested 
in knowing why my particular system of hydrogen atoms exhibited the spectrum it did on that 
day. Answering this question motivates a certain explanatory task: along with more general 
theoretical considerations, I would focus on details of my apparatus and the state of my system. 
Yet, in explanations of atomic behavior in general, we are generally interested in type (ii) why-
questions. Speaking about theoretical atomic spectroscopy, Judd remarks that, “The purpose of 
the analysis is not just to account for the properties of a particular atom as closely as possible but 
also to gain insight into its structure and to discern features that are shared by other atomic 
systems” (1963, p. 1). Some of these type (ii) why-questions—such as those dealing with 
selection rules—are specifically questions about the universality of a behavior displayed by 
atomic systems.  
2.2 COMMUTATOR APPROACHES TO SELECTION RULES5 
A framework for computing matrix elements—and hence for deriving selection rules—is 
provided by the use of fundamental commutation relationships. As in classical mechanics, the 
angular momentum is the vector cross product of the position and momentum vectors: 
 
                                                 
5
 Confer Griffiths (2005), Chapters 4 and 9, for additional details.  
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     . 
 
In terms of the Cartesian components, this equation means the following:  
 
                                                            
 
These equations define the components of the angular momentum as functions of the 
position and momentum. The position and momentum operators are related to each other through 
the canonical commutation relations: 
 
[     ]   [     ]                       [     ]  [     ]      
 
These equations show that the only position and momentum operators that fail to 
commute are x with px, y with py, and z with pz. The fundamental commutation relations for 
angular momentum follow from these relationships: 
 
[     ]           
 
where      is the Levi-Civita symbol, which equals 1 for an even permutation of i, j, k (which 
represent the x, y, and z components),  –1 for an odd permutation, and zero if any index is 
repeated.  
Because different components of angular momentum do not commute with each other, it 
is impossible to simultaneously measure the angular momentum in any two directions. However, 
the square of the total angular momentum, J
2
 commutes with each component.  
 
      
    
    
                      [     ]     
 
As explained earlier, since J
2
 and Jz commute, it is possible to measure the square of the 
total angular momentum and the z-component of the angular momentum simultaneously.  In 
those physical situations where the orbital angular momentum is well-defined, identical 
commutation relations hold for L
2
, Lx, Ly, and Lz.  
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2.2.1 Commutation Derivation of the Selection Rule for ∆ml 
The commutator approach to angular momentum shows that selection rules are a consequence of 
the following theorem and its extensions. Within the context of selection rules, this theorem 
states that if an operator  ̂ commutes with the perturbation operator, then the matrix element 
⟨  | |  ⟩ vanishes unless the initial and final stationary states share the same eigenvalue of  ̂.  
 
Theorem: Let  ̂ be a Hermitian operator such that  ̂ and   ̂ commute, i.e. [ ̂  ̂]        Let    
and    be eigenfunctions of   ̂ associated with eigenvalues    and    respectively. Then 
⟨  | |  ⟩  ∫   
    
 
 
     unless      .    
 
Proof:  
Since [ ̂  ̂]   , it follows that ⟨  |[ ̂  ̂]|  ⟩      
Expanding the commutator, ⟨  |[ ̂  ̂]|  ⟩   ⟨  | ̂ ̂   ̂ ̂|  ⟩    
Since  ̂ is Hermitian and    and    are eigenfunctions of   ̂ ,  
⟨  | ̂ ̂   ̂ ̂|  ⟩  ⟨  |   ̂     ̂|  ⟩    
         ⟨  | ̂|  ⟩    
Thus, either       or ⟨  | ̂|  ⟩     ∎         
 
This theorem supplies a general selection rule for eigenvalues of operators that commute 
with the perturbation operator. From this theorem, the selection rule for ml follows directly.  
The above commutation relations imply that Lz and z commute, i.e. [ ̂   ]   . As 
explained earlier, the eigenvalues of  ̂ —the operator for the z-component of the angular 
momentum—are the magnetic quantum numbers, ml. Furthermore, the operator for radiation 
polarized in the z-direction is itself proportional to z. Thus, from this commutation relation and 
the theorem above, it follows that ⟨  | ̂|  ⟩    unless     , i.e., unless ∆ml = 0.  
Although,  ̂  does not commute with  ̂ or  ̂, the selection rule for radiation polarized in 
the x or y direction can be derived in an analogous way. The commutator [ ̂   ]      is 
placed between the wavefunctions of the initial and final states:  
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⟨  |[ ̂   ]|  ⟩   ⟨  | ̂    ̂  |  ⟩  (     ) ⟨  | |  ⟩    ⟨  | |  ⟩ 
Thus, (     )⟨  | |  ⟩   ⟨  | |  ⟩        (*) 
Likewise, using the commutator, [ ̂   ]       yields  
⟨  |[ ̂   ]|  ⟩   ⟨  | ̂    ̂  |  ⟩  (     ) ⟨  | |  ⟩     ⟨  | |  ⟩ 
So, (     )⟨  | |  ⟩    ⟨  | |  ⟩        (**) 
 
Multiplying (*) by (     ), yields (     )
 
⟨  | |  ⟩   (     )⟨  | |  ⟩ 
 Multiplying (**) by i yields  (     )⟨  | |  ⟩  ⟨  | |  ⟩                        .           
Thus, (     )
 
⟨  | |  ⟩  ⟨  | |  ⟩. 
It follows that either (     )
 
   or the matrix element ⟨  | |  ⟩ vanishes. Thus, 
the selection rule for radiation polarized in the x-direction is       . An analogous 
derivation shows that the same selection rule holds for radiation polarized in the y-direction. 
2.2.2  Commutator Derivation of the Selection Rule for ∆l 
A commutator derivation of the rule ∆l = ±1 was found early on during the development of 
matrix mechanics, appearing first in a paper of Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan from 1926. 
Griffiths’ (2005) presentation utilizes the following commutator relationship:  
 
[   [    ]]               
 
This commutation relation is derivable from the above commutation relations, but the 
derivation is not trivial. This commutation relation implies that 
⟨   |[   [    ]]|  ⟩  ⟨   |            |  ⟩ 
The right hand side equals    (               )⟨    | |  ⟩   
Evaluating the left hand side yields ⟨    |  [    ]  [    ]  |  ⟩ 
   (               )⟨    |[    ]|  ⟩ 
   (               )⟨    |       |  ⟩ 
   (               )
 
⟨    | |  ⟩ 
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Subtracting the left hand side from the right hand side yields  
  ⟨    | |  ⟩ {   (               )    (               )
 
}   
Thus, either ⟨    | |  ⟩    or    (               )    (               )
 
  
With regards to the left hand side of the second equation above, note that 
 (               )                       
Regarding the right hand side, note that                                 
These equations imply that 
                                     
which in turn implies that  
                                       
 [           ][         ]     
Thus, either                or                           can equal 
zero only if      . Since the angular momentum quantum numbers are always greater than or 
equal to zero,       only if         This possibility is in fact disallowed by a selection rule 
on parity (Laporte’s Rule), which states that in a one-electron transition, the orbital angular 
momentum must change from an odd value to an even value. This rule can be derived via a 
parity operator.  
This leaves the second equation: the expression           can equal zero only if 
      . Thus, the selection rule for ∆l is obtained.  
2.2.3 Generalized Commutator Approach 
Although the above derivation for the ∆l rule is valid, it fails to motivate the initial commutator 
relation 
  
[   [    ]]                
 
Condon and Shortley employ a similar derivation for the selection rule on J, the total 
angular momentum. At the beginning of their derivation for the rule on ∆j, Condon and Shortley 
reference the 2
nd
 edition (1935) of Dirac’s Principles of Quantum Mechanics as the source of a 
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general method for deriving selection rules. Dirac—already in the first edition (1930) of his 
text—provides a general characterization of the selection rule problem from the standpoint of 
commutator algebra.  
 Dirac explains that in order to derive a selection rule for stationary states—characterized 
by a complete set of commuting observables  —under a perturbation P, one must find an 
algebraic equation that is linear in the perturbation operator and is a function only of P and the 
operators of the set A. Dirac writes the general form of this equation as 
 
∑     
 
                                                                                   
 
where the functions fr and gr depend only on the operators of the set A.  
 In a particular representation (e.g. Schrödinger, Heisenberg, etc.), fr and gr are explicit 
functions of the eigenvalues of the operators A, and P can be written in terms of its matrix 
elements. By focusing on an operator T of the set A, with eigenvalues t and t’ for the initial and 
final states, we can write (1) above as: 
  
∑       ⟨ | | 
 ⟩    
  
 
   
⟨ | |  ⟩∑           
  
 
   
 
Unless the expression ∑            
    vanishes, the matrix element ⟨ | | 
 ⟩ necessarily equals 
zero. Hence, if an algebraic equation of the form (1) can be found, a selection rule for the 
operator T under perturbation P follows.  
 This general framework motivates the derivation of the commutator equation 
[   [    ]]              . Earlier, in deriving the selection rule for ∆ml, we formed the 
commutator [    ]   , which yielded an equation of the desired form (1). Since l(l+1) is the 
eigenvalue of the total angular momentum operator L
2
, we proceed by forming [    ]  which 
upon evaluation equals    (           )  
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However, this expression is not of the form (1), for it depends on perturbation operators 
x, y, and z, rather than a single vector component. Furthermore, it contains operators Ly, and Lx, 
but the goal is to have    and    be functions of  
 . If     and    are functions of  
 , then (1) 
provides an algebraic restriction on the eigenvalues of   .  
Similar problems arise when we evaluate [    ] and [    ], which (under cyclic 
permutation of x, y, z) equal the following: 
 
[    ]     (           )  
and 
  [    ]                   
 
Noting that       
    
    
 , we are led to try to find a commutator that leads to this 
sum. Forming the more complicated commutator [   [    ]] fulfills this desideratum. 
Ultimately, it is found that [   [    ]]              , which can be generalized to a 
commutator expression involving r. Expanding the commutator on the left hand side results in  
                             , which is of the form (1).  
  Thus, although neither Dirac nor Condon and Shortley explicitly motivate their use of 
this commutation equation, its use is not entirely unmotivated. Dirac proceeds to derive the 
selection rule for ∆l (although he uses a modified definition of the total angular momentum 
operator). He then generalizes this derivation to find the selection rule for the total angular 
momentum.  
 Condon and Shortley eschew Dirac’s reliance on the Cartesian components of the 
perturbation operator and derive the rule for ∆j via the vector expression of the perturbation. 
Nevertheless, the differences between the derivations of Dirac, Condon and Shortley, and the one 
employed above are little more than notational variants. At the heart is the commutator relation 
for [   [    ]], from which the selection rule follows.  
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2.3 GROUP THEORETIC APPROACHES TO SELECTION RULES6 
Due to the complexities of group theory and group representation theory, I focus on details 
required for understanding the group theoretic approach to selection rules. In simple terms, 
groups are symmetries of geometrical figures, such as triangles or squares. An equilateral 
triangle possesses six symmetries: three rotations and three reflections. If an equilateral triangle 
is rotated by 120°, 240°, or 360°, the resultant figure looks the same: the triangle looks as though 
nothing was done to it. This invariance property characterizes these three rotations as symmetries 
of equilateral triangles. Rotating the triangle by 60° would result in a noticeably different figure, 
with the vertices of the triangle shifted. Likewise, each perpendicular bisector running from a 
vertex to the opposite side provides a mirror plane: reflecting all the points of the triangle over 
this line results in an identical triangle. Equilateral triangles have three perpendicular bisectors 
with this property, providing three reflection symmetries. Together, these six symmetries—the 
three rotations and three reflections—form the symmetry group of an equilateral triangle. 
 In quantum mechanical situations, we are interested in the symmetry group of the 
Hamiltonian operator. The Hamiltonian is a mathematical construct encoding information about 
a physical system’s energy states. Since in spectroscopy we are concerned with transitions 
between energy states, it is not surprising that the Hamiltonian plays an important role. Just as a 
group of geometrical symmetry operations leave an equilateral triangle invariant, there is a group 
of quantum mechanical operators that leave the Hamiltonian invariant. This set of operators is 
known as the group of the Hamiltonian, or alternatively, as the group of the Schrödinger 
equation. What operators belong to this group depends on the particular physical system under 
consideration. In this case study, we are largely concerned with an idealization of atomic systems 
known as the central field approximation. In this idealization, we average electronic repulsions 
as a “central field,” yielding a potential energy function that depends only on the radial distance 
of an electron from the nucleus. This potential energy has spherical symmetry: an electron at a 
given radial distance sees the same potential no matter its angular coordinates. In other words, 
the potential energy function—and furthermore the Hamiltonian—is invariant under three-
                                                 
6
 For further details, confer Tinkham (1964) and Petrashen and Trifonov (1969).  
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dimensional rotations. These rotations form the group of the Hamiltonian for this idealized 
atomic system. 
 Mathematically, it is cumbersome to work with geometrical symmetry operations. 
Although these are advantageous for visualization, they present computational difficulties. 
Instead, it is convenient to represent these geometrical symmetry operations with matrices that 
preserve the multiplicative relations of the original geometrical operations. For instance, if the 
outcome of a rotation A followed by a rotation B is the same as an overall rotation C, then the 
matrices representing A and B should multiply in the same way, yielding a matrix that represents 
rotation C. Symbolically, if      , then               , where R(B) is a matrix 
representing the rotation B. A matrix representation of a group is a set of matrices that preserve 
the multiplicative properties of the original group. Matrix representations are powerful because 
they enable us to analyze a geometrical situation in terms of linear algebra. This makes a number 
of tractable solution strategies immediately applicable. Thoughtfully unpacking this ascription of 
intellectual power would require a story like the one I develop in Chapter 4 for derivations of 
selection rules.  
 In fact, for any given group, there are an infinite number of nonequivalent matrix 
representations. Fortunately, each representation decomposes into a manageable number of basic 
building blocks, known as irreducible representations. These irreducible representations encode 
the underlying symmetry types of a physical situation. They specify how functions transform 
under operations from a given symmetry group. Underlying the application of group theory to 
quantum mechanics is the following fact: stationary states of the atom (eigenfunctions of the 
Hamiltonian) transform as irreducible representations of the group of the Hamiltonian. This 
means that each stationary state wavefunction can be labeled by an irreducible representation 
that specifies its symmetry type. Arbitrary functions do not possess this property. In general, 
functions will transform as non-trivial reducible representations, which can be decomposed into 
sums of irreducible representations.  
2.3.1 Selection Rules from a Group-Theoretical Perspective 
Group theory partially re-expresses the matrix element ⟨  | |  ⟩ in terms of the symmetry of 
the unperturbed atomic system. Regarding the restricted case of selection rules, group theory 
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completely re-expresses the necessary—but not sufficient—conditions for non-zero matrix 
elements.  
As before, the problem is to determine when the matrix element ⟨  | |  ⟩ necessarily 
vanishes. Denote the symmetry group of the unperturbed quantum mechanical system by G. 
Group representation theory enables a formal expression of the symmetry of a quantum 
mechanical operator and the symmetry of a wavefunction. As a simple example, consider a 
group theoretical recasting of the earlier theorem in Section 2.2.1 stating that if the perturbation 
operator  ̂ commutes with the operator  ̂—where    and    are eigenfunctions of   ̂—then the 
matrix element ⟨  | ̂ |  ⟩ vanishes unless    and    are associated with the same eigenvalue of 
 ̂, i.e.      .  
Consider first the special case where the perturbation operator  ̂ is invariant under all 
operations of the group G. Then  ̂ transforms as the trivial representation of G, denoted by   . In 
the context of matrix representations, the trivial representation    maps every group element of 
G to a one-dimensional identity matrix. Thus, the traces of the matrices of this representation—
known as the characters of the representation—all equal 1. Let the wavefunctions of the initial 
and final states transform as the irreducible representations denoted by    and   . Then the 
function  ̂   transforms as the direct product representation  
    , which simply equals    
because the characters of    are 1 for all group elements of G. Hence, it follows from the 
orthogonality of basis functions that unless    and    belong to the same irreducible 
representation (more specifically, the same row of the same irreducible representation), the 
matrix element ⟨  | ̂ |  ⟩ vanishes. 
 In the general case where the perturbation operator transforms by a more complex 
symmetry of G, group representation theory leads to the following criterion for non-vanishing 
matrix elements. Let the initial state    transform as the irreducible representation given by  
 , 
the final state    transform as  
 , and the perturbation operator  ̂  transform as     Here,     and 
    are irreducible representations of the symmetry group G of the Hamiltonian of a given 
physical system.  In the general case,    is a reducible representation of G. 
 
Theorem: If the triple direct product                does not contain the trivial irreducible 
representation,   , of G, then the matrix element ⟨  | ̂ |  ⟩ necessarily vanishes. 
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Proof: 
To say that    transforms as the irreducible representation given by  
  means that  
     ∑    
          
Likewise,    transforms as  
 : 
     ∑   
       
 
 
To say that the perturbation operator  ̂  transforms as    means that 
      
   ∑    
 
 
   
      
   is a unitary operator, so it preserves inner products. Thus, the matrix element equals:  
⟨  | ̂|  ⟩  ⟨    |   ̂|  ⟩  ⟨    |   ̂  
    |  ⟩ 
Substituting the corresponding summation expressions for                  ̂  
   
yields: 
⟨  | ̂ |  ⟩  ⟨∑   
       
 
|∑    
 
 
   
     |∑   
      
 
⟩
 ∑    
       
    
    
   
    ⟨  |  |  ⟩ 
For brevity, I denote the product of the representation elements    
       
       
      by 
             These components form a matrix   equal to the direct product of the 
representations            . The equation above can be summed over the N group 




⟨  | ̂ |  ⟩  
 
 
∑ ∑            
     
⟨  |  |  ⟩                                         
 
The matrix               can be decomposed into a sum of irreducible 
representations of the group G by a similarity transformation under the unitary matrix V:  
 
                                                 
7
 In cases where G is a linear Lie group, we replace these sums with integrals over group space.  
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where the summation is over all irreducible representations of G. Hence,  
 






It is an important fact that the sum over the group G of the components of all irreducible 
representations equal zero unless the irreducible representation is the trivial one,   : 
 
∑     
 
                
 
It follows that if the trivial representation is not one of the summands in the 
decomposition of              , then ∑ ∑          equals zero. It follows from (2) 
above that unless this decomposition contains   , the matrix element ⟨  | ̂|  ⟩ 
necessarily equals zero. ∎ 
 
The application of this theorem to particular problems depends on knowledge of the 
irreducible representations for different symmetry groups. Atoms have approximate spherical 
symmetry, formally expressed by the three dimensional orthogonal group O(3). O(3) is the group 
of all rotations and reflections in three dimensional space   . By expressing the transformation 
properties of atomic wave functions and the electric dipole operator in terms of irreducible 
representations of the orthogonal group, the selection rules for angular momentum quantum 
numbers are easily derived. 
2.3.2 Group Theoretic Derivation of the Selection Rule for ∆l 
Once again, recall that electric dipole radiation is represented by the quantum mechanical 
operator   , where   is in this case the elementary charge of an electron. The radial vector r 
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belongs to the irreducible representation    of the orthogonal group. As before, denote the 
angular momentum of the initial state by li and the angular momentum of the final state by lf. As 
explained in Section 2.3.1, the wave function of each electron must belong to an irreducible 
representation of the rotation group. Let     and     denote the irreducible representations that the 
initial and final wavefunctions, respectively, transform as.  
It follows from the theorem above that to determine when the matrix element ⟨  | |  ⟩ 
must necessarily vanish, it is sufficient to analyze the conditions under which the direct product 
representation                               fails to contain the trivial representation 
   in its decomposition.  
The Clebsch-Gordan formula entails that                       . For            
to contain   ,     must be one of the irreducible representations obtained in the direct product of 
      . Thus,     must equal                      . Thus,    must equal     ,   , or     . This 
implies that ∆l = ±1 or 0.  
As in the commutator derivation of the ∆l selection rule, the possibility that ∆l =0 is 
blocked by considerations of parity. Laporte’s rule states the additional requirement that the 
parity of an atom must change during a spectral transition induced by electric dipole radiation. 
While the commutator approach uses the parity operator to derive this rule, the group theoretic 
derivation relies on a function’s evenness or oddness. Even functions are invariant under 
inversion, while odd functions change sign under inversion. The radial vector   is an odd 
function, and thus transforms as an odd representation of the orthogonal group. A one-electron 
wavefunction is even if its orbital angular momentum l is even; it is odd if l is odd. Group 
theoretically, it is clear that               can transform as   —an even representation—only 
if the parities of the initial and final wavefunctions are different, e.g. if the initial state transforms 




Comparing the commutator derivations of Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 with the group theoretic 
derivations of Section 2.3.2, it is clear that these approaches operate on distinct planes of 
thought. Although both approaches are motivated by the strategy outlined in Section 2.1.4—
namely, determine necessary conditions for matrix elements of the perturbation operator to be 
zero—they exhibit different realizations of this strategy. As exemplified by Dirac’s procedure 
(Section 2.2.3), the commutator approach remains closely tied to the algebra of quantum 
mechanical operators. It implements the matrix element strategy of Section 2.1.4 in a more direct 
manner than the group theoretic approach. One advance enabled by group theory is the 
reinterpretation of matrix elements in terms of their symmetries. The symmetry constraint 
derived in Section 2.3.1 provides a different strategy for determining when matrix elements are 
necessarily zero. Expressed in terms of the direct products of irreducible representations, this 
symmetry constraint appears conceptually distant from the original strategy, which is expressed 
directly in terms of operators. Nonetheless, it provides a more tractable path for deriving 
selection rules. 
 In Chapter 4, I undertake a thorough analysis of expressive differences between the two 
approaches. I argue that group theory's re-expression—and subsequent reorganization—of 
constraints governing spectral transitions provides a deeper understanding of selection rules. 
Before developing my account of scientific understanding, I consider whether these derivations 
provide explanations of selection rules. From the arguments presented above, it is clear that these 
approaches justify selection rules. Nevertheless, these derivations may be explanatorily deficient, 




3.0  EXPLAINING SELECTION RULES IN ATOMIC SPECTROSCOPY  
In this chapter, I provide an answer to the question, “In virtue of what criteria are the derivations 
of selection rules explanatory?” On some philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, at 
least some of the derivations in Chapter 2 justify selection rules but nevertheless fail to explain 
them. I consider two such accounts in Sections 3.2 and 3.4, respectively. I argue that these 
accounts do not (at least not always) accurately describe scientific practice. I present an 
alternative account of mathematical scientific explanations in Section 3.1. My use of the word 
“explanation” is deflationary: it is considerably less rich than usual philosophical notions of 
“genuine explanation.” On my account, an argument is explanatory if it recovers the 
phenomenon of interest according to principled mathematical and physical constraints. My 
account does not distinguish derivations from explanations. Instead, I treat the usual richness of 
the word “explanation” under the heading “understanding.” I believe my way of speaking is 
more felicitous for an analysis of how mathematics advances physical insight.   
 My account of explanation is at odds with an alternative account criticized by Robert 
Batterman and Collin Rice (unpublished). Batterman and Rice refer to this family of positions as 
common features accounts. According to common features accounts, derivations may justify that 
a phenomenon occurs, but unless a derivation brings out the relevant features, it cannot be 
explanatory. In Section 3.2, I introduce philosophical positions that defend this viewpoint, which 
I refer to as relevance accounts of explanation. In Section 3.3, I raise two problems for relevance 
accounts of explanation, both epistemic in nature. Section 3.3.1 argues that relevance accounts 
are circular. I contend that we often determine what physical and mathematical details are 
relevant only by constructing a successful explanation—in my deflated sense of explanation. A 
successful mathematical explanation justifies these details as relevant and neglected details as 
irrelevant. I argue that if my weaker notion of explanation grounds ascriptions of relevance, then 
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relevance should not be used as a criterion for explanation. Section 3.3.2 develops a related 
problem stemming from the existence of multiple explanations of a given phenomenon.  
Section 3.4 considers the minimal model account of explanation proposed by Batterman 
and Rice. Batterman and Rice raise similar problems for relevance accounts, and their account of 
relevance avoids the problems I develop. Nevertheless, in Section 3.5 I argue that if taken as a 
requirement for explanation, their methodological prescriptions are too strong. I argue for a 
weaker interpretation where these methodological prescriptions are suggestions—rather than 
requirements—for good explanatory practices. In doing so, I defend my nonstandard account of 
explanation from criticisms supplied by these more restrictive accounts.  
3.1 A DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNT OF EXPLANATION 
In this section, I present my account of scientific explanations that involve mathematics.
8
 As 
noted previously (confer Section 1.1), I use “explanation” in a nonstandard sense. For me, 
“explanation” is a minimal requirement for an argument to provide understanding. I bundle much 
of the richness of philosophers’ usual conception of explanation under the term “scientific 
understanding,” which I examine in the next chapter. My nonstandard account of explanation 
proposes two minimal criteria for an argument to be explanatory: (1) recovering the phenomenon 
to be explained and (2) doing so according to accepted mathematical and physical constraints. I 
argue that these two criteria are sufficient for a deflated notion of scientific explanation.  
First, an explanatory argument must recover the phenomenon to be explained. To 
“recover a phenomenon,” an argument must show how this phenomenon is the endpoint of a 
chain of reasoning. At the end of the argument, we arrive at the phenomenon of interest. For 
instance, derivations of selection rules terminate with a selection rule; it is in this sense that they 
“recover a selection rule.” If an argument fails to recover the phenomenon of interest (either 
approximately or exactly) then it is a failed argument and has no chance of being explanatory. 
We begin to think that an argument might be explanatory when it takes us to the point we wish to 
                                                 
8
 I do not intend my account of scientific explanation to be wholly general.  
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reach, i.e. it recovers the explanandum. Hence, recovery of the phenomenon of interest is a 
minimal requirement for explanation. 
Second, an explanatory argument must proceed according to principled reasons. We 
cannot reason in any fashion we deem suitable. Explanatory arguments must recover the 
explanandum as a consequence of accepted mathematical and physical constraints. Examples of 
physical constraints include boundary conditions, restrictions on the range of possible 
measurement outcomes, and accepted physical laws. Mathematical constraints include theorems, 
methods of computation, algebraic identities, and solution procedures. In using the phrase 
“accepted constraints,” it may seem that I should provide criteria for acceptance. I am skeptical 
that general criteria can be provided that accurately describe the varied conditions under which 
scientists and mathematicians agree on constraints.   
My account has similarities with Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological 
model of explanation (1965). As in Hempel’s account, I take sufficiently constrained derivations 
that recover the explanandum to be explanatory. I identify these kinds of derivations with 
explanations. One problem with such accounts is that they seem to sanction too many arguments 
as explanatory. This worry motivates separate restrictions supported by relevance accounts and 
by Batterman and Rice. Faced with multiple purported explanations, these accounts attempt to 
pick out the genuine explanation, which is generally taken to be singular. This way of talking 
leads to difficulties when analyzing multiple explanations of the type considered below in 
Section 3.3.2. Faced with multiple compatible explanations of a given phenomenon, we need a 
way to distinguish them based on the insights they provide. At the same time, it is natural to 
require that only explanatory arguments can provide insights. One strategy—the strategy 
presumably supported by relevance accounts—would be to say that only one explanation can be 
genuinely explanatory. However, this strategy leaves unclear how other arguments—now taken 
as non-explanatory—could provide insights, which they as a matter of practice do.  
For this reason, I support a flexible account of explanation. My deflationary account 
provides flexibility in distinguishing multiple explanations based on the insights they provide. 
Adopting my minimal account of scientific explanation, both the commutator and group 
theoretic derivations of selection rules are properly seen as explanatory: they both recover 
selection rule phenomena in accordance with physical and mathematical constraints. Having 
classified these derivations as explanatory, we are then in a position to analyze how they provide 
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different insights concerning selection rules. I refer to these differences in insights as differences 
in understanding. The next chapter pursues this account of understanding in earnest by 
examining these derivations in more detail. Before turning to this analysis, I respond to two 
alternative accounts of scientific explanation that apply to my case study.  
3.2 RELEVANCE ACCOUNTS OF EXPLANATION 
In his work on the philosophy of applied mathematics, Chris Pincock has provided a compelling 
account of mathematical explanations in science. Pincock argues that applied mathematics 
furnishes explanations by distinguishing relevant features of phenomena from irrelevant features. 
This is a species of what Batterman and Rice (unpublished) refer to as a common features 
account. According to Batterman and Rice, common features accounts claim that “a model 
explains just when it has certain relevant features in common with actual systems and that having 
these features in common is exactly what does the explaining” (unpublished, p. 1). This view 
embodies a criterion for explanation:  an argument is explanatory only if it references those 
features that are relevant for a phenomenon of interest while eliminating irrelevant details. In the 
following sections, I am primarily concerned with the relationship between relevance and 
explanation. Hence, I refer to positions that adopt this criterion as relevance accounts of 
explanation. This section characterizes relevance accounts using examples that Pincock 
considers. In the next section, I develop two related problems for relevance accounts of 
explanation. These problems help me defend my deflationary account of explanation. 
In much of his work, Pincock has focused on accounting for the content of mathematical 
statements employed in science. This account seeks to specify truth conditions for scientific 
statements involving both physical and mathematical concepts, referred to as “mixed 
statements.” Pincock believes that to characterize truth conditions of mixed statements, we must 
provide appropriate mapping relations between physical models and mathematical structures. 
Through these mapping relations, we can specify what must be the case physically for mixed 
statements to be true. Recognizing a distinction between description and explanation, Pincock 
admits that an account of content does not automatically yield an account of explanation: “We 
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should not expect an account of how mathematics describes a target system to be able to provide 
a complete account of how mathematics can be used to explain features of the target system” 
(2011, p. 212). Nevertheless, Pincock believes that mappings lead to a natural account of 
mathematical explanation, where these maps “ground some ways in which mathematics can help 
in explanation” (2011, p. 213). 
 Pincock's remarks concerning mapping and explanation illustrate what I call relevance 
accounts of explanation. Discussing Euler’s solution to the bridges of Königsberg problem, 
Pincock claims that “the explanatory power is tied to the simple way in which the model 
abstracts from the irrelevant details of the target system. It throws out what is irrelevant and 
highlights what is relevant” (2011, p. 213). On this view, the argument provides an explanation 
of the non-Eulerian character of the bridge system by focusing on the abstract graph structure. 
Focusing on the graph structure eliminates all mention of the bridge system's micro-physical 
details, material construction, variety of bridge types, etc. Since these details do not impact 
whether or not the bridge system is Eulerian, they are irrelevant to the explanation. Pincock 
claims that “what is relevant is the mathematical structure found in the target system itself,” 
providing an example of how his mapping account can extend to an account of explanation 
(2011, p. 213). A second example further illustrates Pincock's commitment to a relevance 
account. Discussing an explanation of wave dispersion that relies on two mathematical models—
models A and B—Pincock claims that “what we need is the mathematical link between A and B 
because only this allows us to appreciate the relevant features of the target system” (2011, p. 
215, emphasis added). Thus, Pincock claims that relevance is a necessary criterion for 
explanations in applied mathematics.  
If relevance accounts are correct, then my account of explanation is deficient. According 
to relevance accounts, unless some of the derivations of selection rules latch onto the relevant 
features of selection rule phenomena, these derivations are not explanatory. To meet the criteria 
laid down by relevance accounts, an explanation of a selection rule should show how it 
references relevant physical and mathematical features. This is a stricter criterion than the two 
minimal constraints I place on explanation in Section 3.1. In the next section, I present two 
problems for relevance accounts that my alternative account of explanation avoids. 
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3.3 TWO PROBLEMS FOR RELEVANCE ACCOUNTS 
By definition, relevance accounts of explanation rely on a notion of relevance to determine 
whether or not an argument is explanatory. Once an argument has successfully recovered a 
phenomenon of interest, relevance accounts instruct us to consider whether or not this argument 
relies on relevant features while eliminating irrelevant details. Relevance plays a crucial role in 
grounding the explanatory character of an argument. This reliance on relevance invites a further 
question: how do we determine which physical and mathematical features are relevant for 
explaining a given phenomenon? In this section, I argue that in the context of mathematical 
explanations we sometimes justify ascriptions of relevance by relying on my deflationary notion 
of explanation. This leads immediately to a circularity problem for relevance accounts: relevance 
accounts use relevance to ground explanations while at the same time grounding ascriptions of 
relevance via successful explanations.  
In Section 3.3.2, I strengthen this criticism by considering how relevance accounts treat 
cases of multiple compatible explanations, such as multiple explanations of selection rules. 
Relevance accounts assume that there is a unique set of relevant features that explain a 
phenomenon. In cases of multiple compatible explanations, this requires us to determine which 
explanations invoke this unique set of relevant features. If some multiple explanations rely on 
different physical features, then we need to determine which features are truly relevant. I argue 
that in making these determinations, we will again rely on my deflated notion of explanation. 
This further supports my contention that in some cases of scientific explanation, relevance 
accounts are circular. 
3.3.1 Circularity 
According to relevance accounts of explanation, an argument is explanatory when it draws upon 
the relevant features of a phenomenon. In order for relevance accounts to work, we need some 
method for distinguishing relevant features from irrelevant features. Without an appropriate 
method, we will not be able to say why one argument uses relevant features (making it 
explanatory) while another uses irrelevant features (preventing it from being explanatory). In 
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general, we do possess a suitable method. This method consists in developing scientific 
explanations—in my deflationary sense of explanation. By developing explanations of physical 
phenomena, scientists determine what features are relevant and what features are irrelevant. 
Unfortunately for relevance accounts, this role for explanations creates a circularity problem: if 
explanations justify our determination of relevance, then relevance cannot justify explanations. It 
seems that relevance accounts put the cart before the horse, using relevance to drag along 
explanations, while in fact it is explanations that guide relevance. 
Batterman and Rice (unpublished) raise a similar worry for relevance accounts. They 
consider an explanation of the universality of some flow patterns present in laminar flow of 
incompressible fluids. For instance, in the laminar flow regime, incompressible fluids exhibit a 
parabolic velocity profile. This behavior is universal in the sense that many micro-structurally 
distinct fluids display this same macroscopic behavior. One explanation of this behavior involves 
a computational model known as a lattice gas automaton (LGA). In recovering a parabolic 
velocity profile, this explanation shows that this universal behavior is governed by three 
fundamental physical properties of fluids: locality, conservation, and symmetry. However, as 
Batterman and Rice contend, “Simply to cite Locality, Conservation, and Symmetry as being 
explanatorily relevant actually raises the question of why those features are the common features 
among fluids” (unpublished, p. 13). Batterman and Rice argue that in order to explain this 
universal behavior, we need an account of “why those features are common and relevant” 
(unpublished, p. 22): 
 
Common features accounts would likely cite the fact that the different fluids have 
Locality, Conservation, and Symmetry in common as explanatorily relevant and maybe 
even as explanatorily sufficient. However, as we emphasized in section 3.3 this is a 
mistake. The fact that the different fluids all possess these common features is also 
something that requires explanation. (Batterman and Rice unpublished, p. 27) 
 
In Section 3.4, I return to Batterman and Rice’s methodological prescriptions for explanations. 
For now, I argue that recovering the phenomenon of interest provides sufficient grounds for 
ascriptions of relevancy. This leads me in Section 3.5 to reinterpret Batterman and Rice’s 
prescription as a constraint on good practice, rather than a constraint on genuine explanations.  
 To see how we determine what features are relevant for explaining a phenomenon, 
consider the derivations of selection rules examined in Chapter 2. If we adopt a relevance 
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account, then these derivations are explanatory only if they draw upon the relevant physical 
details and neglect irrelevant ones. To explain the selection rule on the angular momentum of a 
transitioning electron, we must know what features of atomic systems bear on this selection rule. 
Based on the group theoretic derivation, one natural response is to say that the approximate 
spherical symmetry of atomic systems explains the selection rule on angular momentum. In line 
with relevance accounts, this means that spherical symmetry is a relevant physical feature of 
atomic systems for explaining this selection rule. Other physical details—such as the specific 
atomic number, number of electrons, method of excitation, etc.—are irrelevant for explaining 
this selection rule.  
However, we must ask: how do we determine that spherical symmetry is relevant for this 
explanation? Due to the fact that conservation of angular momentum arises from the rotational 
invariance of space, we have a hunch—before undertaking the derivation—that spherical 
symmetry should matter for explaining a selection rule on angular momentum. Yet, we do not 
know that spherical symmetry is relevant for this selection rule until we complete a successful 
derivation that recovers the selection rule. It is only after we see a derivation of this rule from 
spherical symmetry that we have grounds for saying that spherical symmetry matters in this case. 
The success of the derivation justifies our ascription of relevance.  
Motivated by this example, I argue that a descriptively accurate account of some 
scientific explanations should invert the relevance relation. It is only after an argument succeeds 
in recovering an explanandum that we believe particular features we referenced are relevant. If 
this is correct, then it is inappropriate to use relevance as a criterion for explanatory power: 
explanatory power is in fact a criterion for relevance. To take relevance as grounding 
explanation, we would need an account of relevance independent of explanatory considerations. 
Without such an account, our identification of genuine explanations would be circular. We 
would designate an argument as explanatory if it drew upon relevant features and eliminated 
irrelevant details. Yet, at the same time, we would use the explanation to determine what the 
relevant and irrelevant features were. In other words, we would first assume that we have an 
explanation to determine relevance. Next, we would rely on relevance to justify that we have an 
explanation. This chicken and egg scenario points to a problem with the relevance account. We 
either need to distinguish relevant from irrelevant features independently of any explanation, or 
else we must reject relevance accounts of explanation. 
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3.3.2 Multiple Compatible Explanations 
Cases of multiple compatible explanations amplify the problem of determining relevance, 
introduced in the previous subsection. Multiple compatible explanations occur when we have 
more than one legitimate way of explaining a phenomenon of interest. Derivations of selection 
rules from both the commutator and group theoretic approaches provide an example. From the 
standpoint of the commutator approach, the commutation relations are highly relevant for 
explaining selection rules: by starting with these relations and reasoning appropriately we can 
derive selection rules. Yet from the group theoretic perspective, these commutation relations do 
not appear to be relevant: we do not need to use them to derive selection rules. In this section, I 
argue that multiple compatible explanations pose a problem for relevance accounts. 
 At least implicitly, relevance accounts seem committed to the idea that there is a unique 
set of relevant features that explain a given physical phenomenon. A genuine explanation of a 
physical phenomenon should reference these relevant features and avoid referencing irrelevant 
features. Cases of compatible explanations pose a problem for this view of explanation. If two 
compatible explanations rely on different sets of relevant features, how do we determine which 
set of features is truly relevant? I first illustrate this problem abstractly before returning to my 
case study. Assume that we have two arguments, A and B, that explain—in my deflationary 
sense—a phenomenon P. If we adopt a relevance account, our task is to determine whether A or 
B—if either—genuinely explains P by referencing the unique set of relevant features. According 
to a relevance account, if argument A explains P, then it references all and only the relevant 
physical and mathematical features that account for P. An analogous statement holds for 
argument B. Call the collection of physical and mathematical constraints that are relevant to 
explaining phenomenon P the set R. By definition, a genuinely explanatory argument for P must 
reference R and no irrelevant statements outside R. Thus, if arguments A and B utilize different 
sets of physical and mathematical constraints, then only one of them can be genuinely 
explanatory. Yet, determining which set of features is truly relevant—as opposed to merely 
apparently relevant—appears to be difficult. Our grounds for claiming that any of these features 
are relevant stems from their success in explanations—in my weak sense of explanation. Hence, 
it appears difficult or impossible to determine which set of features is truly relevant since—in the 
context of compatible explanations—each set of features provides a successful explanation.  
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 By legislating that there is at most a single explanation for a given physical phenomenon, 
relevance accounts fail to do justice to scientific practice. We frequently have multiple ways of 
analyzing and understanding a physical phenomenon, and these various points of view stem from 
multiple explanations. Legislating that there is a unique set of relevant features governing a 
phenomenon would imply that many of our purported explanations involve irrelevant details. 
Returning to the present case study, we can examine how this tension might play out in practice. 
A group theoretic derivation shows that selection rules are the result of symmetries of atomic 
systems. For instance, the selection rule for the orbital angular momentum quantum number is 
“due to symmetry under rotation” (Petrashen and Trifonov 2009, p. 267). The rotational 
symmetry of the atomic system provides a constraint on how the orbital angular momentum can 
change as a result of electromagnetic radiation. We discover this constraint as a result of 
applying a general group theoretic criterion for selection rules to the case of rotational symmetry. 
In deriving this selection rule, we learn that rotational symmetry is relevant while other factors 
such as the precise atomic weight, number of atoms in an atomic system, experimental apparatus, 
etc. are irrelevant for the explanation of this selection rule. However, it would be a mistake to say 
that the commutation relations employed in the commutator derivation are likewise shown to be 
irrelevant; these relations provide another method for deriving this selection rule. Yet, if we 
adopt a relevance account of explanation, then only one derivation can employ the unique set of 
relevant features. Thus, if commutation relations are the relevant features that explain these 
selection rules, then the group theoretic explanation in terms of irreducible representations is 
irrelevant, and vice versa. This account of explanation fails to describe the situation we are faced 
with. 
One possible way to diffuse this tension with scientific practice would be to adopt a 
modified relevance account. We could amend relevance accounts to allow for multiple sets of 
relevant features that explain a phenomenon of interest. Provided that these sets of relevant 
features are mutually consistent with each other and—in some sense—embody the “same” 
information, they can both be taken as playing an explanatory role. Nevertheless, this modified 
relevance account does not avoid the previous circularity problem. Even if multiple sets of 
features are taken as relevant, we still need a method—independent of my deflationary sense of 
explanation—for determining what features are relevant. Once again, I argue that in some cases 
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of mathematical explanations, our ascriptions of relevance stem from successful explanations, 
rather than the other way around.  
3.4 BATTERMAN AND RICE: MINIMAL MODEL EXPLANATIONS 
Batterman and Rice provide an account of a specific kind of explanation that at first glance 
appears to solve the problems I raise in Section 3.3 for relevance accounts. Building on earlier 
work by Batterman (2002, 2010), Batterman and Rice develop an account of explanations of 
universality behaviors. As explained in Section 2.5, selection rules are an example of a 
universality behavior. Many different kinds of atomic systems exhibit the same selection rules. 
An important explanatory task is to explain why these micro-structurally distinct systems display 
macroscopic emission lines governed by the same set of selection rules. To characterize this sort 
of explanatory task, Batterman and Rice develop an account of “minimal model explanations.” 
In this section, I introduce Batterman and Rice's account. I explain why one might be tempted to 
see their account as refuting the problems developed in Section 3.3. I then explain why this 
interpretation is in fact mistaken: the problems of Section 3.3 are actually at the heart of 
Batterman and Rice's own account. 
To provide an account of explanations of universality, Batterman and Rice appeal to 
minimal models. A minimal model provides a bare-bones description abstracted from the various 
systems it describes. I use “description” here for lack of a better term. Quoting Nigel Goldenfeld, 
Batterman and Rice characterize a minimal model as “that model which most economically 
caricatures the essential physics” (qtd. in unpublished, p. 9). A minimal model fails to accurately 
describe features of real physical systems. In the case of fluids, an appropriate minimal model 
allows us to “explore patterns of fluid behavior, while virtually ignoring any realistic details of 
any actual fluid” (Batterman and Rice unpublished, p. 10). Since these fluid systems exhibit the 
same behavior, they fall within a universality class. A minimal model explains a universal 
behavior when (1) it lies within the same universality class as the systems it purports to explain 
and (2) under perturbations of physical details, these systems and the minimal model flow (in a 
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topological sense) to the same fixed point. Batterman and Rice illustrate these general remarks 
with an example from fluid mechanics (unpublished, p. 14-15).  
Certain remarks made by Batterman and Rice may be taken as showing that we can—and 
even must—determine relevance before providing an explanation. On this interpretation, 
Batterman and Rice have marked out asymptotic reasoning and renormalization group 
techniques as two strategies for determining the relevance and irrelevance of classes of 
parameters independently of explanations. According to Batterman and Rice, “We require a 
process for discovering (or demonstrating) why certain dominant features are relevant and why 
the various heterogeneous features ignored or misrepresented by the minimal model are 
irrelevant” (unpublished, p. 22-23). Specifically, explanations of universality involve a “process 
of delimiting a universality class by demonstrating that the details that distinguish the model 
system and various real systems are irrelevant” (unpublished, p. 2). In cases where we can make 
determinations of relevance and irrelevance independently of explanatory considerations, my 
objections against relevance accounts dissolve. In these cases we can determine relevance before 
recovering a phenomenon to be explained. Hence, we can appeal to relevance in an explanatory 
capacity.  
Indeed, on one interpretation—an interpretation that I shortly contest—this is precisely 
what Batterman and Rice say about minimal model explanations of universality. This 
interpretation is supported by remarks such as the following: “By showing that all the other 
details are irrelevant we can see why only these common features are necessary for the 
phenomenon to occur” (unpublished, p. 23). Furthermore, Batterman and Rice argue that 
determining what details are irrelevant plays an essential role in explanation: “There are a 
number of techniques for demonstrating that a large class of details of particular systems is 
irrelevant to their macroscale behavior. This is an essential part of the process of delimiting the 
universality class” (unpublished, p. 24). Out of context, these statements are akin to the relevance 
accounts discussed in Section 3.1. Similar remarks in earlier writings also ground this 
interpretation of Batterman. Pincock motivates his own relevance account—in terms of 
mappings—by attributing a relevance account to Batterman: “The proposal for explanation 
suggested by Batterman turns on removing irrelevant details and highlighting relevant factors for 
the phenomenon which is being explained. I have tried to indicate how this account of 
explanation can benefit from the mapping account of content” (2011, p. 216).  
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However, a closer reading of Batterman and Rice shows that they do not support a 
relevance account of explanation. On their account, arguments become explanatory when they 
answer specific why questions concerning universality. These questions include (1) why a 
universal behavior requires systems to exhibit certain common features, (2) why these common 
features are shared, and (3) why differences between these systems are irrelevant for the 
universal behavior (Batterman and Rice unpublished, p. 13). In providing an explanation of a 
universal behavior, we learn why certain features are relevant and other features irrelevant. That 
these features are common and why they are common are results of the explanation, rather than 
part of the explanation. As Batterman and Rice contend, common features accounts are mistaken 
because they “[allow] (a version of) the explanandum to masquerade as the explanans” 
(unpublished, p. 17). On this point, I am in agreement with Batterman and Rice. Nevertheless, I 
disagree with the restrictions that Batterman and Rice place on genuine explanations. In the next 
section, I argue that these restrictions should be interpreted as constraints on good practice rather 
than necessary requirements.  
3.5 REINTERPRETING BATTERMAN AND RICE 
Both relevance accounts and Batterman and Rice's account of explanations of universality place 
numerous restrictions on explanations. Relevance accounts require that explanations reference 
relevant phenomena while not mentioning irrelevant phenomena. As the arguments in the prior 
two sections show, this restriction on explanation is incoherent. Relevance does not always 
ground explanations because sometimes explanations ground relevance. In place of relevance, 
Batterman and Rice constrain explanations of universality by positing specific questions that 
must be answered. Answering these questions requires some form of stability analysis, such as 
through asymptotic reasoning or renormalization group techniques. In this section, I argue that 
Batterman and Rice's account sometimes conflicts with scientific practice. Scientists do not 
always explain universal phenomena in the way that Batterman and Rice prescribe. To resolve 
this dilemma, I propose a weaker interpretation of Batterman and Rice's account.  
 46 
While discussing explanations of universality phenomena, Batterman proposes a strong 
criterion for this class of explanations. According to Batterman, to explain a repeated pattern of 
behavior—such as a universality phenomenon—we need to consider the stability of the behavior 
under perturbation:  
 
We need, that is, to ask for an explanation of those very regularities and 
invariances. This is the fundamental explanatory question. . . . The answer to this 
fundamental question necessarily will involve a demonstration of the stability of 
the phenomenon or pattern under changes in various details. (Batterman 2010, p. 
21) 
 
Similarly, Batterman and Rice catalog a number of questions they deem necessary for explaining 
a universal behavior. These include 
 
(1) Why are a given set of common features necessary for the phenomenon to occur? 
(2) Why are non-shared features between systems in the same universality class irrelevant for 
the phenomenon to occur? 
(3) Why do different physical systems have these features in common? (Batterman and Rice 
unpublished, pp. 13 and 23). 
 
They claim that answering these questions requires some form of stability analysis. First, a 
minimal model must be found that recovers the phenomenon of interest. Next, the universality 
class must be delimited by showing how the systems of interest and this minimal model all flow 
to the same fixed point under perturbations of unshared details. As Batterman and Rice claim, 
“The real explanatory work is done by showing why the various heterogeneous details of these 
systems are irrelevant and, along the way, by demonstrating the relevance of the common 
features” (unpublished, p. 17). Explanations of universality require an argument that answers 
these three questions.  
However, scientists do not always provide answers to these questions when explaining 
universal behaviors, as witnessed by the derivations of selection rules presented in Chapter 2. As 
I argued in Section 2.5, selection rules are properly seen as an example of universal behavior. 
Hence, explanations of selection rules fall within the scope of Batterman and Rice's account of 
explanations of universality. To satisfy Batterman and Rice's explanatory criteria in the case of 
selection rules, we would need to derive selection rules in a more restrictive manner than the 
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derivations presented in Chapter 2. As in those derivations, we would first have to provide an 
argument that recovers selection rules. However, we would also have to show why these 
selection rules are stable under changes in atomic number, ionization, excitation source, etc. We 
would have to show that even when we perturb an atomic system from idealized spherical 
symmetry, the same selection rule phenomena still dominate behavior. One way to do this would 
be to treat a model of a hydrogenic atom as a minimal model for this class of systems. We might 
then be able to show that as we perturb the details of many-electron atoms, these systems and 
this minimal model “flow” toward a shared fixed point. Physicists could then use this analysis to 
answer variants of the three aforementioned questions that Batterman and Rice pose. However, 
in practice, physicists have not answered these questions, at least not in most presentations of 
selection rules.  
Demonstrating the stability of selection rules under perturbation in atomic details would 
further justify the derivations of selection rules presented in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, this kind of 
stability analysis should not be a requirement for explanation. In practice, we learn that these 
selection rules are stable under perturbation by the experimental fact that a wide variety of 
atomic systems exhibit them in their spectra. The commutator and group theoretic derivations 
show that these selection rules follow from accepted mathematical and physical constraints. 
Although these derivations are given for an idealized spherical system, its success gives us 
reason to believe that the features identified—e.g. commutation relations or irreducible 
representations—are relevant to selection rules in real atomic systems. Quantifying the extent to 
which these features impact real atomic systems would further justify why these derivations 
work, but it is unnecessarily restrictive to make this a requirement for explanation. This 
requirement would mean that the derivations in Chapter 2 are mere derivations and not 
explanatory. It would also mean that most—if not all—texts on quantum mechanics derive 
selection rules but fail to explain them. Hence, I take this case study to support the claim that 
Batterman and Rice's constraints on explanation are overly restrictive.  
A weaker interpretation of Batterman and Rice’s account of explanation dissolves this 
tension with scientific practice. Rather than interpret their demand for stability analysis as a strict 
requirement for explanations of universality, I propose that this demand should be taken as a 
constraint on good explanatory practice. On this view, Batterman and Rice's criteria are 
suggested guidelines that apply when scientists want to answer a particular kind of why-question. 
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In the context of selection rules, this question would go something like the following, “What 
justifies the applicability of the central field approximation to elements with atomic numbers less 
than 40?” Batterman and Rice arguably believe that explaining this requires a stability analysis. 
However, on a weaker interpretation, an explicit stability analysis is not necessary for an 
explanation of selection rules. Instead, we can view the applicability of the central field 
approximation as lying in the background of the derivations presented above. This recognizes 
that scientists’ explanations are often elliptical in nature. Actual scientific explanations do not 
always provide detailed justification for the assumptions they employ. This descriptive claim 
provides my main reason for disagreeing with the stronger interpretation of Batterman and Rice 
considered above. I have no such quarrels with the weaker interpretation.  
Additional explanatory criteria could certainly be added to the two minimum criteria of 
my deflationary account of explanation. However, I contend that any additional criteria should 
be viewed as methods to distinguish the quality of explanations rather than to determine whether 
or not an argument is explanatory per se. This points to a key difference between my preferred 
way of talking and Batterman and Rice's. Whereas Batterman and Rice prefer to view these 
additional constraints as restrictions on explanation, I prefer to view them as methodological 
constraints on understanding. I believe that my preferred way of talking opens the door to a more 
fruitful analysis of how mathematics contributes to scientific understanding. Rather than debate 
whether a particular mathematical argument is explanatory, we can focus on how mathematical 
ideas within an argument provide physical insights. This motivates an analysis of a wider variety 
of argument strategies. In some cases, this way of talking sits well with Batterman's own remarks 
on scientific understanding: 
 
Nevertheless, the asymptotic investigation of this equation is essential for an 
understanding of why rainbows always appear with the same patterns of 
intensities and spacings of their bows. The asymptotic investigation of the wave 
equation leads to an understanding of the stability of those phenomena under 
perturbation of the shape of raindrops and other features. (Batterman 2010, p. 21) 
 
On my view, asymptotic reasoning can play an important role in understanding without being a 




I began in Section 3.1 by presenting a deflationary account of mathematical explanations. On my 
account, an argument is explanatory if it recovers the phenomenon of interest according to 
principled mathematical or physical constraints. I have argued that this minimal notion of 
explanation should be taken as basic: it lies at the root of philosophers’ richer notions of genuine 
explanation. By separating our usual notion of “genuine explanation” into a minimal sense of 
explanation and a further sense of scientific understanding, I believe that my preferred way of 
speaking avoids the problems I develop for alternative accounts of explanation. In particular, 
relevance accounts of explanation seem saddled with the problem of determining a unique set of 
physical and mathematical features relevant to a given explanandum. I have argued that we 
sometimes determine what features are relevant only by constructing successful arguments that 
meet my minimal criteria for explanation. This poses a circularity problem for relevance 
accounts. Furthermore, relevance accounts have difficulty acknowledging multiple compatible 
arguments as genuinely explanatory. This creates tension with scientific practice. 
Similarly, Batterman and Rice’s account of explanations of universality behaviors places 
restrictions on explanation that scientists do not always honor. For instance, derivations of 
selection rules generally do not satisfy Batterman and Rice’s criteria, even though selection rules 
are an example of universality. Hence, I have argued for a weaker interpretation of Batterman 
and Rice’s view, wherein their criteria are seen as prescriptions for good explanatory practice. In 
the next chapter, I consider features of selection rule derivations that are separate from 
explanation. These features—such as the linguistic resources and organizational structure that we 
use to derive selection rules—are relevant for an analysis of how the commutator and group 
theoretic approaches provide understanding. I rely on expressive and structural differences 
between the two approaches to articulate how group theory provides a superior understanding of 
selection rules.  
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4.0   UNDERSTANDING SELECTION RULES IN ATOMIC SPECTROSCOPY 
Chapter 3 sought to articulate how the commutator and group theoretic derivations of selection 
rules are explanatory. I argued for a minimal account of explanation, wherein arguments are 
explanatory when they show how a phenomenon follows from accepted mathematical and 
physical constraints. This bare view of explanation alone does not distinguish the intellectual 
content of the commutator and group theoretic derivations. This chapter accommodates these 
differences by developing an account of scientific understanding. Following Manders 
(unpublished), I reserve “understanding” for a body of knowledge shared amongst competent 
practitioners. As such, understanding has little to do with the idiosyncrasies of particular 
scientists. Rather, understanding operates at a level of shared intellectual content. With this 
picture of understanding in mind, I argue that scientific understanding consists in an 
organizational structuring of physical and mathematical constraints. 
To support this claim, I examine the similarities and differences of the commutator and 
group theoretic derivations of selection rules. This philosophical analysis would be enriched by 
considering multiple phenomena in atomic spectroscopy, such as the Zeeman and Stark effects, 
the coupling of angular momenta, the characterization of the eigenvalues of the hydrogen 
spectra, and the Wigner-Eckart theorem. Nevertheless, I focus on selection rules in order to show 
that alternative mathematical frameworks can impact the understanding of a specific problem. 
Differences between the frameworks point to differences in the understanding that the 
derivations provide. 
In Section 4.1, I distinguish two senses of “better explanation.” A traditional conception 
of theoretical virtues captures the first sense of better explanation. This sense focuses on the 
ways in which some explanations might be closer to the truth than others. It is motivated 
primarily by debates concerning how data underdetermines theory. However, in my case study, 
the legitimacy of the group theoretic and commutator approaches is not in question: both 
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approaches provide valid explanations of selection rules. Thus, an analysis of approximate-truth 
is not relevant for an analysis of differences in understanding. This motivates a second sense of 
“better explanation.” This sense focuses on how mathematical and scientific concepts provide 
more illuminating and intelligible explanations of phenomena. Explanations that are better in this 
regard are better qua understanding. In subsequent sections, I argue that this intellectual 
advantage consists in organizing information more effectively. 
To develop an account of understanding, I begin with an analysis of expressive means. In 
the sense used by Manders, expressive means comprise the conceptual resources available for 
thought within an intellectual framework. In Section 4.2.1, I catalog mathematical concepts 
employed by the group theoretic and commutator approaches. This leads to an analysis of how 
the approaches differ in mathematical resources. Section 4.2.2 articulates a notion of expressive 
power distinct from expressive means. Expressive power describes the range of physical 
phenomena that a framework can discuss. Some physical features are only intellectually 
accessible under suitable expressive means. Nonetheless, two frameworks can employ alternative 
mathematical concepts and still talk about identical physical features. I show how differences in 
understanding are partially constituted by differences in expressive power—differences that 
result from alternative expressive means.  
Supported by these considerations of expressive means and expressive power, Section 4.3 
constructs a positive view of understanding. Each expressive means yields a particular 
structuring of physical knowledge. These structures differ in how they organize knowledge, 
accounting for subsequent differences in theoretical virtues such as modularization and 
tractability. In virtue of their differences in expressive means (and subsequently expressive 
power), the commutator and group theoretic approaches present selection rules differently. I 
contend that understanding is constituted by an organizational structure and its concomitant 
theoretical virtues. By analyzing how organizational structures can be intellectually 
advantageous, we come to see how the group theoretic approach provides a deeper understanding 
of selection rule phenomena. This analysis constitutes an explication of Wigner’s belief that 
group theory provides a natural language for expressing selection rules (1959, p. v).  
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4.1 TWO SENSES OF SUPER-EMPIRICAL VIRTUE 
When group theory is applied to quantum mechanics, there is a shared sense that this application 
is of tremendous intellectual power. This raises two questions: What does this enhanced 
intellectual power consist in? How does group theory provide this heightened understanding? We 
begin to answer these questions by recognizing that group theory provides explanations of 
quantum mechanical phenomena. However, an appeal to explanations provides only part of an 
answer. As we have seen in the specific case of selection rules, many aspects of atomic spectra 
do not require group theoretical arguments for their explanation. The commutator approach 
provides explanations too. Thus, if we are going to account for how group theory strengthens our 
grasp of these aspects and what this strengthening consists in, it is insufficient to point to the fact 
that group theory provides explanations. We must look to the way in which these explanations 
are given. In certain cases, group theoretic explanations are superior. We can articulate how 
group theory presents an intellectual advance by fleshing out how group theory provides better 
explanations. This requires that we first consider what it means for an explanation to be better. 
Standard accounts of inference to the best explanation (IBE) contend that better 
explanations are closer to the truth than competing explanations. Proximate truth is in turn 
measured by appealing to super-empirical virtues. These theoretical virtues—such as simplicity, 
ontological parsimony, fruitfulness, and generalizability—are taken as marks of truth. Other 
factors being equal, the more theoretically virtuous explanation is assumed to be closer to the 
truth and hence better than less virtuous explanations. Scientific realists developed this sense of 
“better explanation” to rebut underdetermination challenges from scientific antirealists. In the 
context of those debates, we are challenged to distinguish two competing explanations of a 
phenomenon. If both explanations are empirically adequate, IBE suggests that we catalogue their 
respective super-empirical virtues to determine which one is more likely to be true or, 
alternatively, closer to the truth. 
This IBE prescription for distinguishing explanations is inappropriate for distinguishing 
the group theoretic and commutator approaches. As discussed in Chapter 1, these approaches are 
compatible rather than competing. Hence, the group theoretic and commutator explanations of 
selection rules do not fall within the context of an underdetermination challenge. Since we do not 
need to decide which approach to accept, we do not need to consider how their differences 
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impact proximate truth. Yet, according to the IBE account of “better explanation,” explanations 
provide more understanding when they are closer to the truth. IBE has little more to say about 
understanding beyond this relationship to proximate truth. Consequently, this first sense of 
“better explanation” does not bring us closer to an account of how the group theoretic and 
commutator approaches differ in the understanding they provide. 
Cases of multiple compatible explanations point to a different sense of “better 
explanation.” We need to distinguish compatible explanations, but we cannot appeal to 
proximate truth. Since these explanations differ in the insights they provide, we need an account 
of “better explanation” qua understanding, rather than qua proximate truth. This second sense of 
better explanation focuses on how an explanation can provide a superior understanding of a 
problem, even when alternative explanations are just as likely to be true. Characterizing this 
second sense is difficult insofar as analyzing scientific understanding is difficult. Although this 
analysis does not depend on truth-likeliness, the methodological focus of IBE on virtues remains 
relevant.  
To articulate intellectual differences between compatible explanations, I propose to focus 
on super-empirical virtues. My strategy differs from IBE because these virtues are not used as 
indicators of truth-likeliness. In Section 4.3, I distinguish the group theoretic and commutator 
explanations based on modularization, tractability, uniformity of treatment, and unification. With 
the exception of unification, these are nontraditional super-empirical virtues. They are relevant 
for articulating differences in understanding, even though they may have little to do with 
tracking truth. These virtues focus attention on how different approaches organize information. 
Alternative frameworks lead to different solution procedures for solving problems. These 
procedures differ in how they decompose a problem into sub-problems (modularization), and 
how tractable these sub-problems are. As pointed out above, these differences in organizational 
virtues stem from differences in the mathematical and physical language used to express 
problems. Hence, I begin by describing expressive differences between the group theoretic and 
commutator approaches. 
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4.2 EXPRESSIVE MEANS AND EXPRESSIVE POWER 
Before articulating the sense in which one understanding of a phenomenon can be better than 
another, we must consider the sense in which two ways of understanding can be different. In full 
generality, this issue is too expansive to be treated here. Instead, I focus on how the group 
theoretic and commutator approaches provide different understandings of selection rules. 
Comparing the two approaches, a salient difference is the language used to handle relevant 
features of the phenomena. Although there are points of overlap, the two approaches employ 
different concepts. These different concepts arise in the context of implementing the same 
solution strategy. Perturbation theory tells us that transition intensities are proportional to the 
square of the perturbation operator’s matrix elements. From this fact, it is clear that we should 
find the conditions under which these matrix elements necessarily equal zero, in order to 
eliminate unnecessary computations. Both the group theoretic and commutator approaches 
implement this strategy, but they do so in strikingly different ways. They exhibit differences not 
only in expressive means—the language used to discuss the phenomenon of interest—but also in 
expressive power—the features of phenomena that can be talked about. This latter difference in 
expressive power is itself a consequence of differences in expressive means. Ultimately, these 
differences in expressive means and expressive power result in important organizational 
differences that affect the understanding of selection rules. In Section 4.3, I argue that the 
organizational structures of the two approaches should be identified with the understanding they 
provide.  
4.2.1 Characterization of Expressive Means 
As a working definition of expressive means, I adopt the following:  
 
The expressive means of a given conceptual framework are constituted by the 
mathematical and physical concepts that it uses.  
 
These concepts are brought to bear on issues of description, prediction, and explanation. 
They are the soil from which understanding sprouts. To support this claim, I show how salient 
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intellectual differences between the group theoretic and commutator approaches result from 
differences in expressive means. Although the two approaches have much in common, their 
differences cause a nontrivial change in understanding. After laying out concepts shared by both 
approaches, I discuss key differences. This paves the way for an analysis of expressive power in 
Section 4.2.2. 
The group theoretic and commutator approaches have considerable overlap in expressive 
means because they both utilize a Hilbert space formalism for quantum mechanics. 
Unsurprisingly, this commonality yields considerable overlap in expression. Hermitian operators 
are associated with physical observables, where possible measurement outcomes correspond to 
eigenvalues of these operators. Eigenvectors of the Hamiltonian operator correspond to 
stationary states of the system. More generally, eigenvectors of Hermitian operators correspond 
to physical states that have well-defined values of the corresponding observable. Both 
approaches assume that quantum states can be characterized by a complete set of commuting 
observables, { }. In both approaches, we explicitly work with the angular momentum basis 
where J
2
 and Jz are diagonal, enabling us to label the eigenvectors of the Hamiltonian with the 
quantum numbers j and m, where j indexes the total angular momentum of the stationary state 
and m indexes the z-component of the angular momentum. We denote the other members of the 
set { } collectively by { }, with eigenvalues { }. This enables us to label eigenkets by these 
eigenvalues, denoting an arbitrary stationary state by |   ⟩.  
Distinctively, the commutator approach relies on commutation relations between 
operators. The orbital angular momentum operator is defined as the cross product of the position 
and momentum operators. Using this definition and the canonical commutation relations for 
position and momentum, we derive the cyclic commutation relations for orbital angular 
momentum. Assuming that analogous relations also hold for the intrinsic spin angular 
momentum, we derive the general commutation relations for angular momentum. From these, 
the other relevant commutation relations follow, enabling us to derive selection rules.  
Commutation relations do not form any part of the expressive means of the group 
theoretic approach. Since the concept of commutation relations follows directly from a Hilbert 
space formalism, it is not that the group theoretic approach is conceptually barred from using 
commutators. Rather, the group theoretic approach to selection rules does not need to express 
commutation relations. Instead, we take what could rightly be seen as detours through group 
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theory and group representation theory. As we will see in the next section, this alternative path 
allows us to express physical information that the commutator approach cannot access. This, in 
turn, allows us to restructure our approach to finding selection rules. 
By applying group theory to quantum mechanics, we develop additional expressive 
means beyond those employed by the commutator approach. These alternate expressive means 
allow us to focus on other features of quantum mechanical phenomena—most notably, their 
symmetries—providing a different way of thinking about selection rules. Moving beyond 
individual operators that commute with the Hamiltonian, we focus on the set of operators 
commuting with the Hamiltonian. These operators form a group, corresponding to symmetries of 
the given quantum mechanical system. We call the group of operators that commute with the 
Hamiltonian the “group of the Schrödinger equation.” In the specific case addressed in this 
essay, this group is the full orthogonal group O(3), which is the direct product of SO(3) and the 
reflection group. Through the representation theory of groups, we are able to express unitary 
irreducible representations of this group and direct products of these representations. We label 
the eigenkets of the Hamiltonian operator via irreducible representations of the symmetry group, 
and the perturbation operator as a direct sum of irreducible representations. Thus, the group 
theoretic approach eschews commutators for talk of irreducible representations. This difference 
in expressive means accounts for key differences in expressive power.  
4.2.2 Differences in Expressive Power 
As the Hilbert space formalism for quantum mechanics makes clear, expressive means and 
expressive power are closely related. In this case, the theory of self-adjoint operators provides 
suitable expressive means for discussing physical states. The expressive means blends 
seamlessly into the phenomenon expressed. This indicates that it may not be possible to sharply 
distinguish expressive means from expressive power. Fortunately, a precise distinction is not 
necessary for the two notions to be useful. Whereas expressive means are the accepted linguistic 
resources within a domain of thought, expressive power is the range of phenomena that can be 
talked about. I intend these as working definitions for use in distinguishing the commutator and 
group theoretic approaches. This section characterizes the physical features that the two 
approaches allow us to focus on.  
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The clearest cases of alterations-in-expressive-means affecting understanding arise from 
expansions of expressive power. In transitioning from classical mechanics to quantum 
mechanics, physicists made a new class of phenomena amenable to description, prediction, and 
explanation. This change in expressive means led to a radical change in expressive power. Such 
cases of radical change are interesting; it is worth considering in detail how such differences 
impact scientific understanding. However, compared to the case I consider below, cases of 
radical changes in expressive power are relatively unproblematic. Quantum mechanics provides 
a superior understanding of atomic particles because it treats problems that lie outside the scope 
of classical mechanics. There is more to be said here, but an expansion of expressive power plays 
a central role in constituting these differences in intellectual understanding. Since this expressive 
expansion makes certain problems soluble that were not soluble before, concomitant changes in 
understanding are relatively unmysterious. 
There are also uninteresting cases, cases where alternative expressive means share 
equivalent expressive power and affect few or no differences in understanding. Notational 
variants exemplify this case. In merely changing symbols we use to describe a phenomenon—
substituting sign for sign—we alter neither the phenomena we can talk about nor the problems 
we can solve. Two notational variants say exactly the same. A similar case arises in linear 
algebra, where a single vector can be expressed in terms of different bases. If these bases are 
related by an isometry, then the length of the vector remains invariant. Hence, this change in 
expressive means (this basis change) preserves an aspect of expressive power (vector length). 
Even if the given similarity transformation is not given by an isometry, both bases still have 
sufficient expressive power to characterize vector length. This example takes us a little further 
from notational variants, for now the vector length is not necessarily preserved. Nevertheless, not 
much has changed. Any standard problem amenable to treatment in the first basis is most likely 
just as amenable in the second. These cases are uninteresting because their differences in 
expressive means have not affected a difference in understanding. This is likewise unsurprising: 
if there are no differences in expressive power—both in the problems that the expressive means 
can solve and the features of phenomena they focus on—then altering expressive means does not 
alter understanding.  
Cases lying between these two extremes are philosophically more challenging. There are 
cases where crucial aspects of expressive power remain invariant while the alternative expressive 
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means nonetheless underpin nontrivial differences in understanding. In these cases, alternative 
expressive means can address problems of interest, even as we recognize that an intellectually 
powerful development has occurred. This makes an analysis of understanding more difficult than 
in cases such as the transition from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. As a simple 
example, consider spherical and rectangular coordinates as two alternative expressive means. 
Even though elementary problems soluble in spherical coordinates are soluble in rectangular 
coordinates, the solution procedures are not always equally tractable. Even though a crucial 
aspect of expressive power remains invariant under these nonlinear coordinate changes—
namely, the problems we can solve—coordinate changes are not notational variants. In moving 
from rectangular to spherical coordinates, we focus on different features of geometry. Rather 
than attend to the extension of a vector along three orthogonal axes, we identify it with its radial 
distance and polar and azimuthal angles. Although we have definite methods for transforming 
between these representations, we have not simply replaced sign for sign. Nonlinear coordinate 
changes restructure the information characterizing a geometrical situation. These restructurings 
lead to organizational advantages and disadvantages: problems with spherical symmetry are 
more tractable in a spherical coordinate system. I return to this notion of organizational 
advantage in the next section. 
The group theoretic and commutator approaches provide an example of this interesting 
intermediate case. They share aspects of expressive power but are not notational variants. Some 
overlap in expressive power arises from shared expressive means, such as the Hilbert space 
formalism. These commonalities are not philosophically problematic. For instance, both the 
group theoretic and commutator approaches utilize the concept of a matrix element and refer to 
matrix elements in the same way. This follows from their adoption of the Hilbert space 
formalism for quantum mechanics. These commonalities in expressive power are trivial: they 
occur because both approaches share expressive means. However, the derivations of selection 
rules represent a fundamentally distinct kind of expressive invariant. Even though both 
approaches state and derive these rules—exhibiting an overlap in expressive power—they do so 
via different expressive means. These varied expressive means lead to differences in expressive 
power that nonetheless both suffice for explaining the selection rules of interest. Hence, the 
approaches are not an example of a radical change in expressive means, wherein the problem of 
interest—explaining selection rules—is accessible from only one vantage point. We face a more 
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subtle question of how two approaches can adequately solve the same problem while providing 
different understandings. 
A partial answer to this question stems directly from differences in expressive power. We 
understand selection rules differently from the vantage point of the two approaches because we 
see selection rules as following from different features of phenomena. Although both approaches 
begin at the same point—with matrix elements—and end at the same point, i.e. with selection 
rules, it is not the case that each step within the derivations can be translated from one approach 
to the other. The group theoretic approach expresses ideas that have no analog in the commutator 
approach, and vice versa. For example, the group theoretic approach has suitable expressive 
means to label eigenkets according to their symmetry type (irreducible representations) within 
the group of the Schrödinger equation. The commutator approach—as it stands—lacks suitable 
expressive means to communicate this feature of eigenkets. Although commutation relations can 
express certain symmetry relations between operators, they do not make symmetries of eigenkets 
available for consideration. For its part, the group theoretic approach is unable to express some 
of the detailed relationships between operators that commutation relations embody. The closest 
analog to these relationships is the direct product formed between the (in general sums of) 
irreducible representations that the operators transform as. From the group theoretic vantage 
point, we understand selection rules as consequences of restrictions on direct products of 
irreducible representations, which are symmetry types. From the commutator approach, we 
understand selection rules as consequences of canonical commutation relations and the 
restrictions on matrix elements that they provide.  
Nevertheless, merely focusing on these differences in expressive power does not 
satisfactorily characterize how the two approaches provide different understandings of selection 
rules. From what has been said so far, there is no reason to treat one of these approaches as 
decisive. There are no grounds for saying that the application of group representation theory to 
atomic spectroscopy provides an intellectual advance. Somehow, intellectual asymmetries 
develop between alternative expressive means. These asymmetries arise from differences in 
expressive power, but characterizing them requires more than marking out expressive 
differences. These further considerations can be broadly construed as the relative theoretical 
virtues of alternative expressive means. As argued in Section 4.1, the relevant sense of 
theoretical virtue is of a wholly different nature than its usual meaning within the scientific 
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realism/anti-realism debates. I propose to characterize these considerations as organizational 
advantages. These advantages are not trivial. Their intellectual value extends far beyond 
presentational niceties.  
4.3 UNDERSTANDING AS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
My goal in this section is to further unpack our pre-theoretical notion of understanding. In the 
previous section, I argued that scientific understanding partially consists in the expressive means 
that a framework adopts and the resulting expressive power. Expressive means and expressive 
power manifest the understanding that a framework provides. In what follows, I aim to show 
how scientific understanding relates to the organizational structure of an explanation. I assume 
that understanding depends partially on the approach used to explain a phenomenon. In other 
words, I assume that solutions to problems are understood in light of the solution procedure used 
to obtain them. Even if two approaches yield the same solution to a problem, they can provide 
different understandings in virtue of using different procedures. Granting this assumption, I 
explicate our pre-theoretic notion of understanding by analyzing the solution procedures 
provided by the commutator and group theoretic approaches. These solution procedures have 
different organizational structures. I argue that a superior organizational structure equates with 
superior understanding. To characterize how a solution procedure can be superior compared to 
another, I appeal to theoretical virtues, which I refer to as organizational advantages. These 
organizational advantages include modularization, effective structuring of a problem’s search 
space, tractability, motivation, and uniformity of treatment.  
In Section 4.3.1, I present the physical-mathematical principles that underlie the 
commutator and group theoretic approaches. I provide outlines of these approaches to facilitate 
an analysis of their organizational structures. I argue that the group theoretic approach does a 
better job of breaking derivations of selection rules into sub-problems. This enhanced 
modularization provides some immediate advantages in terms of identifying difficulties and 
understanding how variations in parameters affect solutions. In this case, enhanced 
modularization also facilitates a superior structuring of the search space: whereas a key step of 
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the commutator approach requires a search procedure, the steps in the group theoretic approach 
provide a decision procedure. Additionally, the steps in the group theoretic approach are easier to 
implement, making them more tractable. Finally, I briefly consider how the search-procedure 
step in the commutator approach makes motivating a suitable commutation relation difficult. The 
group theoretic approach does not suffer from an analogous difficulty regarding motivation.   
In Section 4.3.2, I consider two additional organizational advantages: uniformity of 
treatment and unification. Although these two theoretical virtues are sometimes equated, I 
suggest a way of distinguishing them based on an example from my case study. I argue that a 
scientific framework can provide a uniform treatment of a set of phenomena without thereby 
providing a unification of these phenomena. According to the terminology I adopt, unifications 
require an additional condition beyond those required for a uniform treatment. Loosely, I 
characterize uniform treatments as derivations of phenomena using the same solution procedure. 
To unify two phenomena, an approach must treat both phenomena within a single argument, 
showing how the phenomena are intertwined as part of a single, unified viewpoint.  
4.3.1  Modularization and Tractability 
We can appreciate the structural differences between the commutator and group theoretic 
approaches by juxtaposing the strategies they provide for deriving selection rules. At the heart of 
each approach is an underlying principle. In the commutator approach, we utilize Dirac's 
principle (confer Section 2.2.3). This principle provides one method for determining when 
matrix elements of a perturbation operator are necessarily zero. When a matrix element 
connecting an initial state to a final state is necessarily zero, a transition cannot occur between 
those two states under the given radiative mechanism.   
 
Dirac's Principle:  
An equation of the form (4.1) specifies a necessary condition for matrix elements of the 
perturbation operator to be nonzero. 
 
∑     
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Equation (4.1) is an algebraic equation that is linear in the perturbation operator, P. Provided that 
we have specified stationary states of our atomic system in terms of a complete set of commuting 
observables A,    and    depend only on operators within the set A.  
In the group theoretic approach, we utilize what I call Wigner's principle (confer Section 
2.3.1). This principle also provides a necessary condition for non-vanishing matrix elements of 
the perturbation operator. 
 
Wigner's principle: 
If the triple direct product                does not contain the trivial irreducible 
representation,   , of  , then the matrix element ⟨  | |  ⟩ necessarily vanishes. 
 
Under a change of basis, the triple direct product               decomposes into a  direct 
sum of irreducible representations. If this decomposition does not contain the trivial irreducible 
representation,    then a transition cannot occur between initial and final states that transform as 
   and   , respectively. Hence, in order for a transition to be allowed between these states, 
              must contain   .  
 Dirac's and Wigner's principles illustrate how alternative expressive means can organize 
solution strategies differently. Implicit in each principle is a series of steps to follow. These steps 
represent how each principle modularizes the problem of deriving selection rules. An 
organizational advantage, modularization focuses attention on specific aspects of the concepts 
referenced in a solution procedure. By focusing on these specific aspects, modularization allows 
a problem to be decomposed into sub-problems. After presenting the commutator and group 
theoretic solution strategies, I argue that group theory provides a superior modularization. This 
modularization enables a more effective structuring of the search space, leading to enhanced 
tractability. 
Dirac’s derivation procedure—introduced in Section 2.3.3—consists of three steps:  
 
Commutator Approach [Method C]:  
 
C1.)    Determine a complete set of commuting observables.  
C2.)  Find a commutation relationship linear in the perturbation operator that is a sum 
of products of the perturbation operator and an operator diagonal in the basis. 
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C3.)  Use the commutation relationship from C2 to compute an algebraic restriction on 
the matrix elements of the perturbation operator in terms of the eigenvalues of the 
diagonal operator. 
 
We use the complete set of commuting observables from step C1 to label our basis kets. 
In the derivations presented in Chapter 2, we focused on simultaneous eigenkets of the square of 
the angular momentum operator (    and it z-component (  ), labeled by corresponding 
eigenvalues l and m: |  ⟩. In the simple case of Section 2.2.1, we notice that the commutation 
relation between the z-component of the position operator and the operator for the z-component 
of angular momentum satisfies constraint C2: 
[    ]           . 
   is diagonal in the standard angular momentum basis, and   is proportional to the z-component 
of the perturbation operator. Hence, the commutator expression         is a sum of terms that 
are both linear in the perturbation operator (  is raised to only the first power) and products of 
the perturbation operator and an operator diagonal in the basis. At this point, we know 
immediately that a selection rule is at hand. C3 tells us that we simply need to compute the 
selection rule by calculating the expectation value of the commutator [    ]. This tells us that the 
matrix element ⟨    | |  ⟩ equals zero unless          , where m represents the z-
component of the orbital angular momentum.  
 Wigner's principle provides an alternative solution procedure, which I refer to as Method 
G. Notably, it is not the case that Wigner's group theoretic procedure provides a further 
modularization of Dirac’s procedure. The group theoretic approach does not break the steps of 
Method C into additional components. Rather, it employs alternative expressive means to 
structure the solution procedure in a way that is completely different. For instance, Method G 
does not provide additional information to find a suitable commutation relation satisfying step 
C2.  
 
Group Theoretic Approach [Method G]:  
 
G1.) Determine the group of the Schrödinger equation,  . 
G2.) Determine the direct sum of irreducible representations to which the perturbation 
 operator belongs.  
G3.) Label the irreducible representation that the initial wavefunction belongs to. 
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G4.) Compute the direct product of representations of the perturbation operator, 
 initial wavefunction, and final wavefunction. 
G5.) Apply Wigner's principle to determine which irreducible representations the 
 final wavefunction can belong to. 
G6.) Translate the restriction on irreducible representations to a restriction on  
 eigenvalues.  
 
Method G represents an organizational advantage over Method C in part because 
Wigner's principle provides a superior modularization. It focuses attention on more detailed 
aspects of the physical system, allowing us to decompose derivations of selection rules into 
distinct sub-problems. Implicit in Wigner’s principle is the determination of the group of the 
Hamiltonian,  . This group specifies the symmetry of the given physical system uniquely up to 
isomorphism. Whereas Dirac's principle instructs us to focus on the basis functions of a complete 
set of commuting observables, the group theoretic approach narrows our focus to the relevant 
symmetry group. This narrowed focus constrains the rest of the solution. It tells us that the first 
thing we need to do is determine the group of the Hamiltonian. This step (G1) is the first sub-
problem that Wigner’s principle provides. In contrast, the initial step of the commutator 
approach (step C1) is overspecified: it tells us to label our wavefunctions using a complete set of 
commuting observables. In practice, we do not actually find an explicit set of commuting 
operators. For instance, to find selection rules for angular momentum, we focus on the operators 
   and    and work in the standard angular momentum basis.  
Turning to each method’s second step, both approaches focus attention on the 
perturbation operator. Yet, the group theoretic approach emphasizes a particular property of the 
perturbation operator, namely, its symmetry type. Rather than examine the perturbation operator 
wholesale, group theory tells us to focus on the representation that the perturbation operator 
transforms as. This focus introduces a sub-problem that can be performed independently of the 
remaining parts of the derivation: Determine the direct sum of irreducible representations to 
which the perturbation operator belongs. Step G3 presents a distinct sub-problem: once we have 
determined the symmetry group of the Hamiltonian, we can label the symmetry types of the final 
and initial wavefunctions in terms of irreducible representations. Whereas the commutator 
approach focuses attention on entire wavefunctions, the group theoretic approach focuses 
attention on the symmetries of wavefunctions. This heightened focus facilitates the introduction 
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of sub-problem G3. With steps G2 and G3 complete, we can complete the next sub-problem: 
computing the direct product of the representations. An application of Wigner’s principle (G5) 
and a final interpretation step (G6) provide selection rules.  
 The enhanced modularization of Method G is organizational in nature because it pertains 
to how group theory restructures the problem of deriving selection rules into sub-problems. It 
takes the larger problem of determining necessary conditions for non-vanishing matrix elements 
of the perturbation operator and directs attention to specific aspects of the atomic system, the 
perturbation operator, and the initial and final wavefunctions. Through Wigner's principle, group 
theory specifies precisely how the symmetries of the perturbation and wavefunctions govern 
selection rules. By decomposing a problem into sub-problems, modularization provides two 
advantages.  
First, if we run into difficulties, modularization helps us pinpoint where those difficulties 
arise. The group theoretic approach specifies a set of facts that are sufficient for deriving 
selection rules, including the group of the Schrodinger equation, the representation of the 
perturbation operator, and the triple direct product decomposition. If we were to get stuck in our 
derivation, it would be because we encountered difficulties in obtaining one of these pieces of 
information. Modularization provides an organizational advantage because it disentangles these 
pieces of information. For instance, if we get stuck finding a representation for the perturbation 
operator, we know that to solve this problem we do not need to focus more on the symmetry 
group of the problem (G1) or focus on labeling the symmetries of the wavefunctions (G3). 
Provided that we have completed step G1, we do not need to tinker with it more to solve our 
difficulty with step G2. Likewise for step G3. By disentangling this information, we are better 
able to direct attention to solving sub-problems. In contrast, if we run into difficulties in 
determining a suitable commutation relation, step C2 provides little guidance about where our 
problem lies. Step C2 tells us the form our commutation relation must take, but it does not 
decompose this problem into sub-problems. It does not disentangle how the perturbation operator 
and other operators relate to one another, or what role the eigenfunctions play. The lack of 
further modularization creates an organizational disadvantage. The commutator approach fails to 
organize physical relations as effectively as the group theoretic approach. 
A second advantage of modularization is increased awareness about how varying the 
content of a problem affects the solution. For instance, step G1 makes it clear that the selection 
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rules of a physical system depend on its symmetry group. If we vary the symmetry group of a 
problem, we understand that the selection rules might change. Step G2 affords a similar 
awareness with regards to the perturbation operator. It makes apparent that finding selection 
rules for a higher order perturbation or an alternative radiative mechanism could alter the 
symmetry type of the perturbation operator, therefore leading to different selection rules. We 
also see that certain features of the problem—such as the overall symmetry group and the 
symmetry types of the wavefunctions—remain invariant under changes in the perturbation 
operator. Similar remarks pertain to step G5, where we implement Wigner’s symmetry principle. 
Due to the precision of this step in focusing attention on irreducible representations, it is possible 
to back-calculate the class of symmetry-types necessary for a perturbation to allow a transition 
between initial and final wavefunctions of given symmetries. In this way, modularization affords 
flexibility in setting up problems. Not only can we determine selection rules under a given 
radiative mechanism, but also we can determine what radiative mechanisms would allow a 
transition between specified initial and final states. Method C is not sufficiently modularized to 
support an analogous back-calculation procedure.  
These differences in modularization directly impact how the two approaches structure the 
search space when deriving selection rules. The commutator approach modularizes the problem 
into a search procedure, whereas the group theoretic approach provides a decision procedure for 
computing selection rules. Like modularization, this difference is organizational: it deals with 
how we have related physical and mathematical constraints to construct a solution procedure. 
Consider the form of Method C first. Step C2 delimits a class of suitable commutation relations, 
namely, those that are sums of products of diagonal operators where each term is linear in the 
perturbation operator. However, step C2 does not specify how to compute a suitable 
commutation relation. It characterizes the form of suitable commutation relations without 
providing a procedure for deriving them. It is in this sense that Method C is a search procedure. 
Once we have obtained a suitable commutation relation, it is clear from Dirac's principle that we 
can follow step C3 to derive a selection rule. However, we must first search for a suitable 
commutation relation. In contrast, the steps in Method G are decisive. Each step poses a question 
that has a definite answer. The Hamiltonian and perturbation operator have definite symmetries. 
Once we have determined these, we can implement the rest of the steps algorithmically. Hence, 
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group theory provides a superior structuring of the search space: it eliminates the need to search 
for a suitable commutation relation. 
The group theoretic approach also provides enhanced tractability. Overall, the steps in 
Method G are easier to implement than the steps in Method C. Once we idealize the quantum 
mechanical system as possessing a well-defined symmetry group, the last five steps in Method G 
are straightforward computations. We simply identify the symmetries of the perturbation and 
initial wavefunction, compute their direct product, and apply Wigner’s principle to determine a 
restriction on the allowed irreducible representations of the final state. Method C suffers from a 
deficiency in tractability due to step C2. It is difficult to determine a suitable commutation 
relation satisfying this constraint. Provided that we had a suitable commutation relation, it would 
be straightforward to apply step C3 and determine a selection rule. However, step C2 represents 
a tractability bottleneck: it provides little guidance on how to determine a suitable selection rule. 
In this case, tractability seems to mirror whether or not the method is a search procedure or 
decision procedure, but this need not always be the case. Sometimes search procedures are easier 
to implement than decision procedures, meaning that a search procedure can be more tractable 
than a decision procedure. 
The commutator approach’s deficiency in tractability points toward another 
organizational disadvantage: a lack of motivation. In many presentations of the commutator 
derivation of the selection rule for the orbital angular momentum, a suitable commutation 
relation is introduced with little or no exposition regarding why this commutation relation is 
suitable, or how one might originally discover that it is suitable. For instance, in Condon and 
Shortley's (1935, p. 60) and Griffiths’ (2005, p. 373) presentations, no principled reasons are 
given for utilizing this commutation relation beyond the fact that it yields the correct result. This 
is not to say that a suitable commutation relation cannot be motivated. Heisenberg’s presentation 
(1926, p. 369-371) motivates a similar commutation relation via an analogy with classical 
mechanics. Furthermore, as we saw at the end of Section 2.2.3, a motivational story can be told 
for this commutation rule. Nevertheless, Dirac’s principle—as it stands—has difficulty 
motivating a suitable commutation relation. In contrast, Method G makes evident why we 
perform each step the way we do. The tools we use are motivated by Wigner’s principle and the 
symmetry of the Hamiltonian. Getting clear on the significance of motivation and how 
alternative expressive means influence motivation is a difficult task. In the context of her own 
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case study, Rebecca Morris has developed a more thorough treatment than the cursory remarks I 
make here (unpublished).  
Comparing the commutator and group theoretic approaches, their organizational 
differences are apparent. I have analyzed these differences in terms of organizational virtues, 
including enhanced modularization, effective structuring of the search space, tractability, and 
motivation. These virtues are organizational because they stem from how an expressive means 
structures a solution strategy for solving a problem. The commutator and group theoretic 
approaches differ in how they relate the operative physical concepts used in deriving selection 
rules. Group theory provides linguistic resources that enable these physical relations to be 
reorganized into a more effective solution strategy. An analogous structuring is not accessible 
from the commutator point of view, which lacks suitable expressive means to provide these 
organizational advantages. These organizational virtues manifest one sense in which the group 
theoretic approach provides a deeper understanding of selection rules. 
4.3.2 Uniformity of Treatment and Unification 
Distinct from modularization and tractability, we can also analyze the sense in which these 
approaches lead to a uniform treatment of selection rules. In this section, I characterize this 
notion of uniformity of treatment and compare it to Kitcher’s account of unification (1989). I 
argue that the present case study motivates a distinction between uniformity of treatment and 
unification. Finally, I consider generality and its relationship to global fruitfulness. Each of these 
theoretical virtues represents an organizational advantage that I claim contributes to 
understanding.  
Both the commutator and group theoretic approaches provide uniform treatments of 
selection rules in atomic spectroscopy. To provide a uniform treatment of a class of phenomena 
is to show how these phenomena can be understood via the same procedure. Provided we can 
derive suitable commutation relations, or alternatively characterize our system in terms of a 
suitable symmetry, either approach yields the relevant class of selection rules. This notion of 
uniform treatment is closely related to Kitcher’s (1989) account of unification. According to 
Kitcher, a scientific theory unifies a class of phenomena when it derives those phenomena from 
the same underlying argument pattern. In Kitcher’s terms, Methods C and G above are argument 
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patterns that draw upon the explanatory store of quantum mechanics and—in the case of Method 
G—group representation theory. On Kitcher's view, both approaches unify selection rules in 
atomic spectroscopy because they derive these selection rules according to the same argument 
pattern. Thus, Kitcher’s notion of unification is analogous to the concept of uniform treatment 
that I adopt here. 
The present case study suggests a sense of unification more restrictive than Kitcher’s, one 
that is distinct from the notion of uniformity of treatment. An approach uniformly treats two 
explananda if it derives those explananda according to the same procedure. An approach unifies 
these two explananda if it shows how a single argument accounts for them both. The following 
example illustrates this distinction. The group theoretic approach provides a uniform treatment of 
both the selection rule on the total angular momentum and on the parity of electronic states 
(Laporte’s rule). This means that the same argument pattern explains these rules, namely an 
instantiation of Method G. In one sense, this uniform treatment unifies these two rules by 
showing that they both follow from the same argument pattern—this is the sense of unification 
found in Kitcher. Yet, there is also a stronger sense in which group theory unifies the total 
angular momentum selection rule and Laporte's rule: it allows us to take these two separate 
instantiations of Method G and combine them into one derivation. Whereas the separate 
derivation of the total angular momentum selection rule utilizes the symmetry of the group 
SO(3), the separate derivation of Laporte’s rule uses the symmetry of the inversion group. By 
taking the direct product of the special orthogonal group in three dimensions with the inversion 
group, we arrive at the mathematical structure known as the full orthogonal group (rotation-
inversion group) in three dimensions: O(3).  By utilizing the irreducible representations of O(3), 
we can derive the selection rules for the total angular momentum and Laporte’s rule in a single 
unified derivation. This single derivation constitutes a unification of these two selection rules. If 
Wigner’s remarks are to be heeded, the application of group theory was of great historical 
significance in explaining this rule. Wigner held the “explanation of Laporte’s rule (the concept 
of parity)” to be one of the most significant contributions of the application of group theory to 
quantum mechanics (1959, v). 
Intriguingly, this unification extends even further. From the rows of the irreducible 
representations of the full orthogonal group we arrive at the selection rules for the z-component 
of the angular momentum. Furthermore, we can even build in the permutation symmetries of the 
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electrons into the group of the Schrödinger equation, allowing us to derive—in one unified 
derivation—the selection rule on the spin quantum number. Thus, through a more expansive 
view of the group of the Schrödinger equation, the group theoretic approach affects a unification 
of selection rules in atomic spectroscopy. This provides a meaningful sense of unification that 
can be distinguished from uniformity of treatment. On this dimension, the group theoretic 
approach is superior to the commutator approach. The commutator approach lacks suitable 
expressive means to effect an analogous unification. In principle, we could concatenate the 
commutation relations for the various selection rules into a longer commutation relation. If we 
had this overarching commutation relation, we could derive the selection rules in one argument 
structure. However, I contend that the algebra involved in this derivation would be intractable: 
we would not be able to derive the selection rules. Furthermore, this purported “unification” 
would be artificial in the sense that no clear physical meaning would attach to the concatenated 
commutation relation. This is in contrast to the mathematical structure of the full orthogonal 
group, which has a clear interpretation as an underlying symmetry of atomic systems. 
Uniform treatments and unifications enhance understanding by casting multiple 
phenomena under a single viewpoint. Expressive means that recast phenomena uniformly enable 
phenomena to be understood uniformly. Uniformity is closely related to the notion of generality, 
which considers the scope of an intellectual framework. By definition, uniform treatments are 
general: they treat multiple phenomena uniformly. However, uniform treatments vary in 
generality. Some uniform treatments handle proper subsets of phenomena that are covered by 
more general uniform treatments. Within the context of atomic spectroscopy, both Methods C 
and G are equally general: they cover the same range of phenomena. Once we step outside the 
bounds of the present case study and consider selection rule phenomena in molecular and nuclear 
spectroscopies, the group theoretic approach gains the upper hand. The group theoretic method 
supplies a uniform treatment in terms of molecular and nuclear symmetries. In contrast, it is not 
clear that appropriate commutation relations can be found in order for the commutator approach 
to apply in these areas. If this is correct, then the group theoretic account provides a more general 
treatment of selection rule phenomena. This would support the claim—which again goes beyond 




5.0  CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter 2, I presented two different methods for deriving selection rules: a commutator 
approach and a group theoretic approach. These methods are compatible with each other, so we 
can accept them both. Rather than focus on the fact that these approaches theoretically justify 
selection rules, I have examined how they justify selection rules. I have used the intellectual 
differences between the commutator and group theoretic approaches to motivate my positive 
accounts of scientific explanation and understanding. To conclude, I summarize how these 
accounts provide a philosophical picture of my case study. I clarify what I take to be the 
organizational nature of scientific understanding. 
We began in Chapter 1 with the presumption that group theory provides a deeper 
understanding of selection rules than the commutator approach. My task has been to explicate 
this pre-theoretical notion of scientific understanding, providing a partial account of what it 
consists in. Before developing this account, I considered the nature of explanation in science. It 
is natural to require that understanding arises from explanatory arguments. Motivated by this 
relationship between explanation and understanding, Chapter 3 considered whether commutator 
and group theoretic derivations of selection rules should be viewed as explanatory or non-
explanatory. According to a relevance account of explanation, these derivations are explanatory 
insofar as they draw upon physical and mathematical features that are relevant to selection rule 
phenomena, while eliminating irrelevant features. Since the commutator and group theoretic 
derivations draw upon different physical features, a strong interpretation of relevance accounts 
entails that only one approach can be explanatory. However, the underlying assumption of 
relevance accounts—namely that relevance grounds explanation—fails to describe scientific 
practice. As I argued in Section 3.3, there are cases where we determine whether a feature is 
relevant or irrelevant by providing explanations. Batterman and Rice’s minimal model account 
of explanation raises a similar problem for relevance accounts.  
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In Section 3.5, I argued that the explanatory constraints supported by Batterman and Rice 
are likewise too strong. Scientists do not always provide explicit stability analyses of 
explanations of universal behavior. In the case of selection rules for atomic spectra, most—if not 
all—derivations shirk a rigorous stability analysis. Instead, these derivations implicitly assume 
that, for systems of low atomic number, perturbations disrupting the central field approximation 
are negligible. Hence, I recommended interpreting Batterman and Rice’s constraints as 
guidelines for good explanatory practice, rather than strict requirements for explanations. I 
believe these constraints should be taken as dealing with the quality of an explanation as opposed  
to explanation simpliciter. Accordingly, the derivations of selection rules support a minimal 
account of mathematical explanations wherein arguments are explanatory if they recover the 
phenomenon of interest according to accepted physical and mathematical constraints. My 
account treats mathematical explanation as inherently justificatory: an explanation justifies a 
phenomenon. Although we could prescribe additional features as constraints on explanation, I 
believe it is more felicitous to view these features as constraints on understanding. On my 
account, the derivations of selection rules in Chapter 2 are explanatory, and we can naturally 
move to an analysis of how they differ in the understanding they provide.  
My account of understanding relies on super-empirical virtues, such as modularization, 
tractability, uniformity of treatment, and unification. Unlike in the context of traditional 
underdetermination debates, it is irrelevant whether or not these virtues are epistemic indicators 
of truth-likeliness. In the context of compatible explanations, relative truth-likeliness is not in 
question. Rather than pertaining to truth or a metaphysical interpretation of our physical theories, 
these virtues are organizational in nature. They deal with how an expressive means structures 
solution procedures to problems. Alternative expressive means enable us to focus on different 
physical features, leading to differences in expressive power. Having the conceptual resources to 
analyze certain physical features—such as symmetry types—greatly facilitates problem-solving. 
My account of understanding provides a method for distinguishing the intellectual content of the 
commutator and group theoretic approaches. I argued that group theory provides a superior 
structuring of the search space when deriving selection rules. Group theory provides an 
intellectual advantage by re-expressing and reorganizing the mathematical and physical 
constraints that undergird these derivations. To effect this organization, we require sufficient 
expressive power to discuss the symmetry types of atomic systems. This, in turn, requires 
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sufficient expressive means. Through the concept of irreducible representations, group 
representation theory provides suitable expressive means to accomplish this task. I believe that 
my theoretical account of understanding captures salient features of our pre-theoretical notion of 
scientific understanding.  
In this thesis, I have analyzed one example where group theory provides a superior 
understanding of atomic spectra. Although this necessarily limits the scope of my conclusions, I 
am optimistic that features of this case study will generalize to other cases, both within and 
outside atomic spectroscopy. Within the theory of atomic spectra, my methodology applies to the 
Stark and Zeeman effects, the Wigner-Eckart theorem, the coupling of angular momenta, and 
perturbation theory, where both non-group theoretic and group theoretic approaches have been 
developed. I plan to analyze these phenomena to strengthen my account of how group theory 
deepens scientific understanding of atomic spectra. Outside atomic spectra, non-group theoretic 
alternatives are not so readily found. Although lacking a benchmark for comparison complicates 
philosophical analysis, I am hopeful that lessons learned from atomic spectra will facilitate a 
more thorough analysis of group theory’s role in molecular and nuclear spectroscopies and 
particle physics. This case study supports a crucial philosophical moral relevant in these other 
contexts: we cannot account for group theory as an intellectual advance merely through the 
explanations it provides. Recognizing that group theory provides explanations is only the start of 
a philosophical analysis. The real work consists in explicating ways in which group theory 
furnishes explanations. Lessons learned from group theoretic cases may further generalize to 
other areas of applied mathematics. I hope to have motivated the fruitfulness of taking a closer 
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